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Introduction
Since the early part of this century, American courts and
legislatures have taken incremental steps toward liberalizing hearsay
rules.' The general thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence favors
the admission of evidence,2 which is reflected in both the definition of
hearsay, which departs from the common law and excludes nonassertive conduct,3 and in the list of twenty seven formal and two
residual hearsay exceptions widely used in Federal courts. 4 States
also have been eagerly creating new hearsay exceptions, including
residuals.5 Once enacted, new exceptions generally remain6 and
contribute to a continuous process of expanding the use of hearsay
evidence.7
Yet despite this trend toward more liberal use of hearsay,
1. The hearsay rule in the early part of the 19th Century encompassed a broader
range of conduct than does the current Federal Rules of Evidence. See Stephan
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in 18th Century
England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 565 n.341 (1990). See also EDMUND M. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 368-77 (1961) [hereinafter MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS]
(citing examples of courts and legislatures liberalizing the hearsay rules from 1925
through 1951); Ronald J. Allen, Commentary: A Response to Professor Friedman; The
Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REv. 797, 798 (1992)
(stating that the current hearsay rule is in "its death throes"); Mirjan Damaska, Of
Hearsay and its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 457 (1992) (book review) [hereinafter
Damaska, Of Hearsay] (courts are lowering barriers against admission of hearsay "in
virtually all Anglo-American jurisdictions"); Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony
Hearsay Exception; A Study in Rulemaking, JudicialRevisionism, and the Separation of
Powers,65 N.C. L. REV. 295, 309-11 (1989) (stating that early 20th Century liberalization
was the result of greater focus on accuracy as a primary goal of the rules of evidence).
2. See Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (describing the
Federal Rules of Evidence as having a "liberal thrust"); see also FED. R. EVID. 401-403
(defining relevance broadly).
3. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
4. See Allen, supra note 1, at 799 n.11 (stating that there are probably thousands of
cases, many unreported, admitting hearsay under the residual exceptions).
5. See id. For example, in California there are no residual exceptions comparable
to those in the Federal Rules, but the legislature recently has adopted exceptions to meet
specific situations. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1360, 1370 (West Supp. 1998).
6. See Allen, supra note 1, at 799 (arguing that hearsay exceptions, once formed,
remain). "To my knowledge, there are virtually no examples of hearsay exceptions being
eliminated .... " Id
7. The movement toward relaxing strictures on the use of hearsay is particularly
pronounced in civil cases. Hearsay rules in the United States, as exemplified by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, are in many instances more permissive in civil than in criminal
cases, and in practice have been substantially weakened by modern expanded discovery
systems and the relentless growth of hearsay exceptions.
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sweeping proposals for elimination of, or radical surgery on,
established hearsay doctrines generally have not been successful.
The United States Congress and most state legislatures have rejected
proposals for radical hearsay reform. The American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence in 1942 proposed a Benthamite
liberalization of the hearsay rule which would freely admit hearsay
whenever the declarant testified or was unavailable,' but no
jurisdiction adopted the Model Code, partly because of this radical
proposal.9 The 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed less
radical hearsay reform," but it too generally was rejected." The
version of the Federal Rules of Evidence originally adopted by the
Supreme Court also substantially liberalized the hearsay rule, 2 but

8.
"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the
declarant (a) is unavailable as witness, or (b) is present and subject to cross-examination."
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942).
If the declarant is available but uncalled, his statement would be excluded unless it
was covered by a categorical exception, such as admissions, excited utterances.
declarations against interest and business records. See id. Rules 502-529. In essence, the
proposal was a rule of preference for live testimony supplemented by a list of categorical
exceptions.
9. See Roger C. Park, Forward: The Hearsay Reform Conference: The New Wave of
Hearsay Reform Scholarship, 76 MINN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1992) [hereinafter Park, New
Wave Scholarship] (concluding that the Model Code of Evidence was an utter failure, in
large part because of its radical relaxation of the hearsay rule); see also Roger C. Park, A
Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 53 n.11 (1987)
[hereinafter Park, Hearsay Reform] (citing additional authorities for the same
proposition).
10. Uniform Rule 63(1) would admit hearsay statements of testifying witnesses, but
if the declarant was unavailable or available but uncalled, the statement would be
admissible only if it came within a listed categorical exception, some of which required
unavailability. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953) (superseded 1974).
Uniform Rule 63(4)(c) provided an exception when the declarant was unavailable as
a witness with respect to "a statement narrating, describing or explaining an event or
condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had
been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in
good faith prior to the commencement of the action." UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) (1953)
(superseded 1974).
11. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 53 n.13: see also Christopher B.
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity. 76 MINN. L. REV.
367, 367-77 (1992).
12. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(b)(2) provided for admission of statements of
recent perception of unavailable declarants. Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and
804(b)(6) provided for residual exceptions that contained no notice provision or
requirement that the evidence be superior to other means of proof, but demanded only
that the statement have guarantees of trustworthiness "comparable" to those of
established exceptions. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 53 n.14: Fredrica
Hochman, Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in the Federal Rules of
Evidence:A CriticalExamination, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 687 (1978).
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major reforms were re-written and narrowed by Congress.'
It is particularly in criminal cases that liberalizing tendencies
have been less radical, more uneven, and most controversial,
resulting in higher barriers to hearsay evidence. The hearsay rules
themselves generally limit admission more severely in criminal than
in civil cases,' 4 and Supreme Court interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause have supported the continued
viability of the hearsay rule in criminal cases.' 5 Also, while the Court
has in the past tended to interpret liberally hearsay exceptions of the
Federal Rules, recent cases demonstrate a more conservative
approach toward some exceptions, particularly with respect to
criminal cases. 6 Finally, neither lawyers nor academics generally
13. The Rules which emerged from Congress in 1975 contained, along with
traditional exceptions, two residual exceptions with additional limitations, thus giving
courts somewhat greater freedom to admit hearsay not falling within traditional
exceptions, but not the scope that the Supreme Court had proposed. The House
Committee on the Judiciary struck the two residual exceptions on the ground that they
would create too much uncertainty in the law, but the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
reinstated them with additional criteria. The Conference Committee added a notice
requirement, and the two residual exceptions with limitations became part of the final
version which emerged from Congress. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 18-19 (1974), reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065-66. The Senate Committee reported that "[i]t is intended
that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances [which] indicate that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of
trustworthiness and necessity." Id.
14. While the common law hearsay rules generally do not distinguish between civil
and criminal cases and the Federal Rules of Evidence generally apply to both civil and
criminal trials, in a number of specific situations the Federal Rules restrict the admission
of hearsay more severely in criminal cases. See FED. R. EvlD. 804(b)(3) (declarations
against interest); FED. R. EvID. 803(8) (public records); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying
declarations); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony); FED. R. EVID. 803(22)
(judgments). Also, erroneous admission of hearsay is more often found harmless error in
civil cases, thereby curtailing judicial discretion to a greater degree in criminal cases. See
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 800[03], at 800-18 (1985).
15. The Court has rejected the "radical" proposal to limit the operation of the
Clause to its original purpose and largely constitutionalized the hearsay rule with respect
to prosecution evidence through presumptions tied to traditional hearsay exceptions. See
infra Part II.D. See also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Trial,
67 NoTRE DAME L. Rev. 403, 495-99 (contending that the Supreme Court has strongly
bound the Confrontation Clause to the hearsay rule); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a
PartialEconomic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 n.9
(1992) [hereinafter Friedman, Game Analysis].
16. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) (holding that
the against penal interest exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) covers only
those declarations or remarks within an accomplice's confession that are "individually
self-inculpatory," and does not allow admission of "non-self-inculpatory statements" even
if made within a broader self-inculpatory narrative); Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,
156 (1995) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common
law's temporal limitation such that prior consistent statements of a witness are admissible
as non-hearsay only if made before the alleged recent fabrication or improper influence
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advocate sweeping liberalization of the hearsay rule in criminal cases.
While scholars such as Thayer, Wigmore, Morgan, Maguire, and
McCormick supported radical reform simplifying and liberalizing the
hearsay rule in general, 7 the practicing bar has tended to defend the
rule with its complexities, 8 and a substantial number, if not the
majority, of widely respected modern evidence scholars support
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules which
would maintain substantial exclusion of hearsay in criminal cases. 9
Even those contemporary American scholars who strongly advocate
radical reforms amounting to almost free admissibility of hearsay in
civil cases put aside criminal cases in view of the defendant's
confrontation rights and other considerations."
For example,
or motive).
17. See Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule - A Benthamic View of Rule
63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 942 (1952) (citing
Thayer, LEGAL ESSAYS 303 n.1 (1908), who advocated a less restrictive hearsay rule). In
response to a request by a committee of the Boston Bar Association in 1896 for
suggestions on needed changes in the law, Thayer proposed the following: "No
declaration of a deceased person, made in writing ante litem motam, shall be excluded, as
evidence, on the ground of hearsay, if it appear to the satisfaction of the judge to have
been made upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." Id. See also EDMUND M.
MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LITIGATION 169-95 (1956) (advocating simplification of hearsay rules such that
statements of unavailable declarants generally would be admitted as, for example, an
affidavit by an eyewitness to an accident); John M. Maguire, The HearsaySystem: Around
and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1961); John M. Maguire & Edmund M.
Morgan, Looking Forwardand Backward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937)
(characterizing the hearsay rules as "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut
from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists, and surrealists"); Charles T. McCormick,
The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 Yale L.J. 489, 504 (1930) (urging that hearsay should be
inadmissible except where "the judge in his discretion finds it needed and trustworthy").
18. See authorities cited in Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 52 n.9.
19. See id.
20. Professor Ronald Allen contends that the hearsay rule in civil cases "should be
allowed to lie quietly, undisturbed, for eternity," but believes that "criminal cases are
different because of the Confrontation Clause and the crude systems of discovery."
Allen, supra note 1, at 799 n.8, 800. Professor Roger Park would replace the hearsay rule
with a notice-based admission principle in civil cases, but would retain, and in some
contexts expand, the hearsay rule in criminal cases, where the risks of declarant and
witness unreliability, surprise, and unfair use of governmental power are greater. See
Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 88-108 (suggesting in criminal cases even more
stringent unavailability requirements; contending, for example, that when an out-of-court
statement is accusatory, it should not be admissible if the witness is available to testify).
Professor Richard Friedman would largely replace the hearsay rule with a relevancy
principle in civil cases, but would take a more conservative approach with respect to
prosecution evidence in criminal cases. See Friedman, Game Analysis, supra note 15, at
726 n.10 (contending that the Confrontation Clause should operate to exclude hearsay
"regardless of declarant's availability, if the declarant made the statement with the
anticipation that it might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime and the
accused has not had an adequate opportunity to examine the declarant." In other cases
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"hearsay post-modernists" 21 such as Roger Park and Christopher
Mueller point to process-based concerns and other non-traditional
hearsay dangers which they contend continue to justify substantial
restrictionson admission of hearsay in criminal cases.'
Since abolition or radical reform of the hearsay rules in criminal
cases is not a realistic option in view of current constitutional
constraints and the strong resistance of judges and practicing lawyers
to the free admissibility of hearsay evidence, the significant questions
for American evidence reformers concern the advisability of
continuing the movement toward liberalization, staying the present
course, or beginning a retreat toward more limited admissibility,'
and whichever the direction, identifying the criteria which should
guide reform.
Probing the foundations for the rules excluding hearsay in
American criminal cases, I grapple with these questions, analyzing
and contrasting traditional jury-oriented justifications, which rest on
distrust of lay factfinding, with more recent adversary-based
rationales of comparativists and process-based concerns of postmodernists, which emphasize complexity and reach beyond the
traditional declarant-oriented view of hearsay dangers. Drawing on
comparative insights and process-based rationales, I propose that
hearsay analysis focus on adversary and verdict integrity concerns,
which generally will result in more liberal admissibility rules.
However, I conclude that, even if constitutionally and politically
possible, it would not be a good idea to largely eliminate restrictions
on hearsay evidence in criminal cases.
Clearly, the traditional deficiencies of hearsay evidence which
arise from the lack of ability to test by cross-examination the
declarant's perception, memory, sincerity and narration provide the
central rationale for general limitations on use of hearsay evidence in
place of first-hand information. The natural distrust of hearsay
evidence reflects common notions of reliability and fairness and the
belief that, if possible, factfinders should hear from observers, and
criminal defendants should be able to question accusers, directly.
However, this foundation alone cannot support the broad and
elaborate Anglo-American scheme excluding hearsay, particularly
the accused would have to rely for exclusion on the "general and flexible standards of due
process.").
21. The term "post-modernist" is used to identify those who view the hearsay rule as
supported by non-traditional concerns, and not to refer to its current social, philosophical
or literary usage. See generally Mueller, supra note 11.
22. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9; Mueller, supra note 11.
23. In England the debate concerns "whether the hearsay rule should retreat even
further back and not with whether it should penetrate areas from which it is excluded."
A. A. S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 214 (1989).
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statements of unavailable declarants.
Two procedural aspects of our criminal justice system render it
particularly vulnerable to hearsay evidence and act as twin buttresses
providing additional support for the unique and forbidding structure
of the Anglo-American hearsay rules.2 4
First, our adversary
procedure allows lawyers, particularly prosecutors, almost unfettered
power to create and shape both out-of-court statements of declarants
and trial testimony of witnesses. The main strength of the adversary
system-party motivation to investigate and present favorable
evidence and attack the opponent's evidence by cross-examinationrenders it vulnerable to the creation of tainted evidence. The
independent factfinder (usually, but not necessarily, the jury), which
operates largely free of procedural checks on verdict integrity,
provides the second buttress supporting exclusion of hearsay in
criminal cases. Trial and appellate procedures depower judges both
as supervisors of juries and reviewers of jury verdicts. Jurors usually
are left on their own without either judicial guidance in evaluating
hearsay or responsibility to justify their decisions, and our appellate
system does not provide for meaningful review of verdicts. The
institution of the common law jury provides some support for the
hearsay rules, but not because lay factfinders are less capable of
dealing with hearsay than professional judges. The lack of legal
training or experience of jurors, while grounds for some concern, is
not the principal reason for hearsay rules in jury trials. To the extent
that the existence of the jury supports the hearsay rule, it does so
more by reason of its accompanying procedural characteristics-a
single proceeding with limited pretrial discovery in which a largely
unreviewable decision is given without a reason-than by the danger
that people untrained in the law would tend to overvalue hearsay
evidence. Nor are hearsay restrictions justified by the bifurcated
nature of our trial court which separates the judge as law-giver from
the jury as fact-finder. There is still a powerful argument for the
hearsay rule in unitary bench trials.
These twin procedural characteristics-highly
adversary
procedures and the unchecked factfinder-increase the possibility of
convictions or acquittals based on weak and uncorroborated hearsay
and should inform and guide efforts to define the nature and
parameters of our hearsay rules. 5 Legislatures should look to these
24. To outsiders, common law evidence "appears arcane" and the hearsay rule is
regarded as "so bizarre that [it occupies] one of the most forbidding corners of the entire
Anglo-American legal structure." MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFT 1, 88
(1997) [hereinafter DAMASKA, ADRIFT].
25. Modification of these structures rendering our system "less adversary" and
providing greater assurance of verdict integrity would weaken rationales for exclusion of
hearsay evidence, but at present, significant alteration of these basic structural
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factors in deciding whether to adopt new or restrict existing hearsay
exceptions, and courts should consider them in interpreting and
applying the hearsay rule and exceptions, particularly residual or
"catch-all" exceptions.
A close analysis of these rationales suggests the need to adjust
our hearsay rules from an adversary-oriented perspective, which in
most contexts would lead to more liberal admission of hearsay on
behalf of both the prosecution and the defense. While we should
continue to exclude hearsay which is particularly susceptible to
dangers inherent in our super-adversary system, exclusion usually is
not justified merely by distrust of the jury's ability to evaluate
hearsay in terms of ordinary declarant-oriented weaknesses,
unenhanced by adversary dangers. Hearsay should not be excluded if
the primary dangers posed by adversary-oriented concerns are not
present or are substantially diminished.
However, corroboration and sufficiency standards should be
increased to insure verdict integrity in light of the absence of checks
on the independent and unaccountable factfinder. With respect to all
hearsay, whether admitted under specific or residual exceptions, the
judge should require a showing of reliability by reference to its
nature, the circumstances of its creation, or other evidence in the
case. Moreover, a sufficiency rule should bar convictions which are
based primarily on hearsay statements unless they are clearly
corroborated and the judge also is convinced of defendant's guilt.
With these protections, nonadversary-created hearsay generally
should be admitted on behalf of both the prosecution and the defense
despite the presence of traditional declarant-oriented concerns.
I. Foundations of the Hearsay Rule
A. The Conventional View of Hearsay and its Weaknesses

The conventional and most common explanation for the hearsay
rule rests on the assumption that hearsay evidence is less reliable
than in-court testimony which is subject to trial safeguards,
principally cross-examination.
Despite the usual "assertionoriented" definition of hearsay found in statutes and cited by lawyers
as an out-of-court statement offered for its truth,26 the traditional
rationale for characterizing a statement as hearsay and for excluding
characteristics is unlikely.
26. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c); 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 1766, at 250
(Chadborne rev. 1974).
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it as unreliable is "declarant-oriented" '27 in the sense of focusing on
whether the probative value of the statement requires reliance on the
credibility of the declarant with attendant dangers of unreliability.28
The Supreme Court recently explained that this declarant-oriented
rationale is based on weaknesses associated with the declarant and
the absence of the means to reveal those weaknesses which generally
are available with respect to in-court witnesses: "The declarant might
be lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates, he
might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or
taken out of context by the listener."2 9 Hearsay is excluded, the
Court noted, because "the ways in which these dangers are
minimized for in-court statements-the oath, the witness' awareness
of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the
witness' demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent
to cross-examine-are generally absent for things said out-ofcourt."3
This conventional Wigmore-Morgan rationale points to
diminished trustworthiness, primarily from the lack of opportunity to
reveal the declarant's weaknesses through cross-examination. For
Wigmore the fundamental reason for exclusion of hearsay is the lack
of opportunity to test the reliability of the declarant by crossexamination.3 1 Morgan was less enthusiastic but recognized that
"there can be no doubt that when properly used, [cross-examination]
is a most effective instrument for the discovery of the facts so far as
27. The quoted terms are taken from Roger Park's comparison between the two
approaches to defining hearsay. See Roger Park, McCormick on Evidence and the
Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65
MINN. L.REV. 423 (1981). Park analyzes and criticizes McCormick's mixed and confusing
definition in the second edition of his HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, which has
since been revised. See also Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 MISS.
L. REV. 125 (1995).
28. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 801 and the introductory note to
Article VIII lists the risks of faulty memory, perception, narration, and sincerity. See also
Morgan, Hearsay Dangersand the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV.
177, 178 (1948) [hereinafter Morgan, Hearsay Dangers] (listing five hearsay dangers
associated with the declarant); Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 957, 959 (1974).
29. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598-602 (1994). See also 5
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1362, at 7; Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 55-56.
30. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598. Similar considerations are found in the Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule 801 and in the introductory note to Article VIII.
31. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1362, at 7. Wigmore was convinced that the
problem with hearsay stems solely from the lack of opportunity to test reliability by crossexamination of the declarant. See id. See also 28 GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157-60 (1978); Affirmations of the effectiveness of crossexamination often echo Wigmore's assertion that it is "the greatest legal engine invented
for the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 26, §1367, at 32.
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they are within the ability of the witness to disclose."32
B. Arguments for Admission of Hearsay

Despite the general weaknesses of hearsay evidence, it can be
convincing, reliable, and powerful evidence which we often use as a
basis for important decisions in our personal and professional lives.
Indeed, most evidence upon which we rely out-of-court is the
equivalent of hearsay, and if we applied the rule outside the
courtroom, it would "bring all business to a standstill."33 Certainly,
most every-day decisions are not as momentous as those criminal
juries are asked to make, and people would prefer first-hand
information by credible witnesses when called upon to make
decisions of great consequence.34 Yet, we often rely on hearsay in
important aspects of our lives when it appears reliable or when firsthand sources are unavailable.
Furthermore, many other forms of evidence routinely submitted
to juries also are weak, misleading, or difficult to challenge by crossexamination. Consider the testimony of eye-witnesses that so often
has lead to misidentifications and convictions of the innocent35 or the
testimony of addicts, paid informants, and others with strong motives
to fabricate. 36 Weighing and giving proper value to such evidence
typically is the function of the factfinder, and we trust the jury to
perform this function with regard to numerous forms of potentially
32. Edmund Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L.
REV. 247, 254 (1937) [hereinafter Morgan, Jury and Exclusionary Rules]. For similar
qualified praises of cross-examination, see LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 352 (1982) (pointing out that while in practice crossexamination rarely destroys a witness, it often leads to qualifications of witness
assertions); Mueller, supra note 11, at 391 (stating that while cross-examination cannot
make witnesses reliable, it does give the opponent a chance to test and challenge their
stories so the jury can evaluate them).
33. Charles T. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute, 20 TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1942).
34. See Mueller, supra note 11, at 383.
35.

See NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,

EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL, 24 (June 1996) In the majority of the 28 cases

studied in which defendants were convicted by juries and incarcerated, but later
exonerated by DNA evidence, eye-witness testimony had been the most compelling
evidence at trial.
36. See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1382, 1394 (1996) (observing that criminal informers,
particularly jailhouse snitches, are generally manipulative, devious, and would not

hesitate to commit perjury or manufacture evidence, such that prosecutors should
presume that a jailhouse confession presented by an inmate is false until the contrary is
proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
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false or misleading evidence. Even when eye-witness identifications
are shown to have been produced by unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures, the Supreme Court has been "content to rely upon the
good sense and judgment of American juries, where evidence with
some 3element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury
mill." 7
Finally, presence of the declarant at trial is no guarantee that
effective cross-examination will be possible with respect to
declarant's hearsay statements. In United States v. Owens38 the
Supreme Court found no violation of either the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the Confrontation Clause by admission of a witness's
prior identification statement despite the witness's inability because
of memory loss to testify concerning the basis for the identification.3 9
The Court stated that the requirement of indicia of reliability or
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" for statements falling
outside a traditional hearsay exception does not apply when a
declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted
cross-examination.4" Furthermore, the Court concluded that, despite
memory loss, the declarant was "subject to cross-examination"
concerning the statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), since ordinarily, a
witness is regarded as "subject to cross-examination" when he is
placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions."
Thus, when a declarant testifies at trial, effectiveness of crossexamination can be severely limited, yet both trial testimony and
prior out-of-court statements of the witness often may be admitted.
Why then, should hearsay generally be treated differently
from other forms of evidence which are weakened by elements of
untrustworthiness? Why not follow the recommendations of those
37. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (characterizing a pre-trial single
photograph identification procedure as both suggestive (only one photo was used) and

unnecessary (no emergency or exigent circumstances existed), the Court nonetheless
found both the out-of-court and the in-court identifications sufficiently reliable to be
considered by the jury on the ground that there was not "a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification").
38. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
39. A prison counselor was beaten with metal pipe, suffering skull fracture and
severely impaired memory. Id. at 556. During the first few days following the attack the

victim was unable to remember the attacker's name, but three weeks later, he named
defendant and identified him from a photo display. Id. At the trial, the victim could not

recall seeing defendant during the attack, but did remember making the photo
identification which was admitted into evidence and led to defendant's conviction. Id.
40. The Court adopted Justice Harlan's position that "a witness's inability to recall
either the underlying events that are the subject of the extra-judicial statement or
previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given,

does not have Sixth Amendment consequence." Id. at 558 (quoting California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 188 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
41. Id. at 561.
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who urge courts to admit hearsay and instruct juries to weigh and
accord it fair and proper value along with other evidence in the
case?"
C.

Explanations for Exclusion of Hearsay
(1) The Jury or the Adversary System?

The conventional and most commonly held explanation for
common law rules of evidence, and the rule excluding hearsay in
particular, is that they arose from, and now rests upon, the existence
of the common law jury.43 Proponents of this view point to Professor
James Thayer's well-known assertion that the English law of
evidence is "[t]he child of the jury."" This traditional view relies on
both historical and functional arguments. Traditionalists contend
that, along with other common law exclusionary rules, hearsay
restrictions arose with the development of the modem independent
jury and that current exclusion of hearsay is justified primarily by the
weaknesses of lay, as opposed to professional, factfinding with
respect to evaluating second-hand evidence, which suffers from the
four declarant-oriented weaknesses.
However, a substantial body of scholarly opinion regards the
jury-oriented foundation of evidence law as simplistic and
misdirected. Sixty years ago, Professor Edmund Morgan described
the "adversary feature" of our system as "quite as distinctive as is its
use of a jury" and urged caution in accepting the popular assumytion
that the jury is the sole or chief cause of our rules of evidence.' He
contended that "[i]t may be true that non-jury systems have not
created a hearsay rule; but that has no compelling significance so long
as they have not adopted an adversary theory of litigation." 46 He
believed that "[t]he adversary theory of litigation is directly
42. See infra notes 208-209.
43. See H. A. Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence,A Comparison, 67 LAW. Q. REV. 67,
67 (1951) (The view that the hearsay rule owes its origin and justification to the jury still
represents "the dominant opinion of the textbooks."). See also John H. Langbein,
Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1172 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, Ryder Sources] (positing that
the essential attribute of the modem law of evidence is the effort to exclude probative but
problematic oral testimony, such as hearsay, for fear of the jurors' inability to evaluate
the information properly). Damaska points to alleged frailties of amateur fact-finders as
"the oldest and most widely accepted justification for distinctive Anglo-American
evidence rules." DAMASKA ADRI-rsupranote 24, at 28.
44. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON
LAW 47 (1898).
45. Morgan, Jury and ExclusionaryRules, supra note 32, at 248.
46. Id. at 255.
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responsible for many [exclusionary rules]; and judicial distrust of the
jury for not a few"; however, he characterized Thayer's dictum that
the English law 47of evidence is "the child of the jury" as "not more
than half-truth.,
A number of comparative law scholars also contend that our
hearsay rules are not founded exclusively, or even primarily, on the
existence of the jury. Rather, they stem from, and now primarily rest
upon, procedural and structural aspects of our criminal process,
primarily the adversary method and its main characteristic-partz
control over the pre-trial investigation and presentation of evidence.
(2) Complexity and Process-BasedConsiderations
Another line of attack on traditional justifications for exclusion
of hearsay has been leveled by "hearsay post-modernists49 or "new
wave" scholars" such as Roger Park and Christopher Mueller, who
believe that explanations focusing on trustworthiness and crossexamination alone are "too reductionist."'' Specifically, they contend
that the dangers from admission of hearsay evidence go beyond those
that underlie the declarant-oriented rationale and reflect "processbased" concerns and other considerations that are both complex and
pragmatic. 2 They brand the untested declarant theory as excessively
restrictive for failing to account for other problems posed by hearsay,
including the danger of distortion or fabrication by the in-court
witness, unfair surprise, making trial preparation more difficult,
uncontrolled judicial discretion, and fear of leaving "litigation
underdogs" unprotected, particularly criminal defendants facing

47. Id. at 255, 258.
48. Professors Mirjan Damaska and John Langbein argue that the jury and the
adversary process are distinct institutions and that the hearsay rule arose with the
development of the adversary system, rather than with the independent jury. See infra
Part II.F.2.a. Professor Hans Nijboer also believes that exclusionary rules of evidence
"cannot be exclusively related to existence of the jury." J.F Nijboer, Common Law
Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a Continental Perspective, 41 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 299, 319 (1993).
49. The term "post-modernist" was used by Professor Christopher Mueller. See
generally, Mueller, supra note 11.
50. The term was employed by Roger Park. See Park, New Wave Scholarship,supra
note 9.
51. Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 77; see also Mueller, supra note 11, at 370,
384. But see Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1525, 1546 (1996) (favoring a declarant-oriented approach to hearsay "because it
captures the theory underpinning the system").
52. Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 56 (citing the general opposition to
liberalization by practitioners who by definition have first-hand experience with such
dangers).
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possible abuse of governmental power. 3 They claim that hearsay
rules, especially in criminal cases, are "more than merely misguided
efforts to protect jurors from fact-finding failures"54 and convey a
"deeper message" than mere concern with trustworthiness.55 These
scholars generally urge moderation in hearsay reform in criminal
cases, and in some contexts urge the adoption of more stringent
hearsay restrictions. 6 Similar process-based rationales have been
advocated for Constitutional limits on prosecution hearsay based on
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 7
These post-modern, process-based explanations for hearsay and
confrontation restrictions point to both jury and to adversary system
dangers. Like traditional jury-based justifications, they rely to some
extent on the assumption that the lay jury is unable to properly
53. See id. at 56-65 (contending that lawmakers were concerned with these problems
when drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Mueller, supra note 11, at 384. See
generally Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495 (1987)
(pointing to hearsay justifications in addition to reliability, including the need to prevent
parties from swamping their opponents with hearsay, particularly in the form of
documentary evidence).
54. Park, New Wave Scholarship,supranote 9, at 365.
55. Mueller, supranote 11, at 391,394.
56. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 108 (arguing that accusatory hearsay
should not be admissible if the declarant is available to testify).
57. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the ConfrontationClause:
A Proposal for a Prosecution Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 561 (1992)
(advancing a "prosecutorial restraint model," which would restrict government creation
of evidence in secret, which "hinders the jury from scrutinizing a process in which jurors
should play a role as political participants); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to
Confrontation"Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 616 (1992)
(contending that the Confrontation Clause "operates not as a direct restraint on abusive
governmental practices, but as a grant of positive rights to those charged with a crime"
and that the Clause was drafted to constitutionalize the adversarial jurisprudence by
giving rights to the accused, which acted as a "one check of federal power in a system of
checks and balances"); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause:
An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS LJ. 77, 81-82, 167 (1995) (contending that the
framers of the Constitution were concerned not merely about some specific abuses that
happened within a trial, but intended to constitutionalize the basic trial system itself by
granting the accused the authority and tools to challenge all the evidence: "The
prosecution's case was tested not only when the accused could prevent ex parte affidavits,
but when the accused could challenge everything against him."); Roger W. Kirst, The
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485 (1987)
(contending that reliability cannot be the sole foundation for hearsay jurisprudence,
advocating a "procedural dimension" to confrontation doctrine which takes into account
the procedures by which the prosecution gathers evidence, and proposing a confrontation
rule that distinguishes between hearsay evidence created in the process of prosecution
from other hearsay evidence). See also Eileen A. Scallen, ConstitutionalDimensions of
Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-DimensionalConfrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV.
623 (1992) (pointing to societal dimensions of confrontation, such as influencing witness
behavior and venting frustration, which are based on a "physical meeting" between the
witness and the accused).
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evaluate hearsay evidence.58 But they also believe that the process by
which evidence is gathered and presented diminishes the probative
value of hearsay evidence such that on occasion process-based
dangers may be so great, and cross-examination so ineffective, that
neither judge nor jury can be trusted to properly evaluate hearsay
evidence. 9 Thus, it is important to inquire further as to what extent
our hearsay rules are justified by the institution of the jury, the
operation of our adversary system, or both. But first, a digression to
constitutional restrictions on use of hearsay evidence.
D. Constitutional Restrictions on Hearsay Evidence
Although constitutional limits on use of hearsay in criminal cases
apply only to the prosecution, they have been closely linked to
common law hearsay rules by the Supreme Court and pose significant
restraints on hearsay reform. The Court has assumed that the
confrontation right and the hearsay rules are "designed to protect
similar values,"' and although admissibility restrictions of the former
generally are less than those of the latter, each stands on similar
foundations with respect to the regulation of hearsay in criminal
cases; and they, of course, operate together in criminal trials. In light
of the close relationship, indeed substantial overlap, between the
hearsay rules and confrontation jurisprudence, it is not surprising to
find jury, adversary, and process-based concerns the focus of both.
Thus, it is best to analyze hearsay and confrontation standards
together with such concerns informing both exclusionary
foundations.6
The Supreme Court has largely constitutionalized the hearsay
rule with respect to prosecution evidence through presumptions tied
to traditional hearsay exceptions.62 The Court in Ohio v. Roberts
58. See, e.g., Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 60-61 (contending that while
jurors may use hearsay intelligently in ordinary life, they are likely to overvalue it and be
mislead in a formal criminal trial which is "a formal, ritualized proceeding unlike anything
in their ordinary lives").
59. See Mueller, supra note 11, at 391, 394; Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at
65, 108.
60. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
61. Professor Mueller convincingly argues that reformers should focus on hearsay

doctrine with respect to process-based concerns and not leave such concerns to
confrontation jurisprudence alone, since it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will provide
leadership as it did during the Warren Court era and any new constitutional doctrine
likely would offer only limited protections for criminal defendants and would "chill
debate.., at other levels." Mueller, supra note 11, at 400-02.

62. The Supreme Court has strongly bound the Confrontation Clause to the hearsay
rule. See Van Kessel, supra note 15, at 495; see also Friedman, supra note 15, at 725 n.9.
Professor Graham Lilly largely supports the Court's approach, hypothesizing that the
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announced a two-pronged standard of necessity and reliability,
stating that ordinarily prosecution hearsay is not admissible unless
the declarant is unavailable and the hearsay evidence "bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability."'63 Tying the Confrontation Clause to
the hearsay rules, the Court found that "[r]eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception."' In other cases, the statement is inadmissible
"absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '
Later, the Court limited the unavailability requirement to prior
testimony' and explained that where admission of a statement is
based on a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rules, no special
showing of trustworthiness is required.6 7 However, statements not
falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception are presumed
unreliable and are inadmissible unless marked with such
truthworthiness that "there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule."6
Thus, the two-pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts has been reduced
in most cases to a single reliability test by the Court's limitation of
the unavailability requirement to statements in prior judicial
Other considerations, such as the interest of the
proceedings.
defendant and of society in providing a forum in which the accused
personally may face his or her accusers, have been downplayed with
respect to the admission of hearsay. The Court has rejected the
argument that the face-to-face confrontation right applicable to
testifying witnesses also applies in the hearsay context, requiring a
showing of a hearsay declarant's unavailability.69 That right, the
Co urt concluded, does not apply to the admission of hearsay, but

Clause may have been meant to incorporate contemporaneous common law doctrine,
including the rule barring hearsay statements of available declarants. See Lilly, Notes on
the ConfrontationClause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207,210-12 (1984).
63. Roberts,448 U.S. at 63.
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id. The Court later demanded that such "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" must be demonstrated only from circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief and do not include
other evidence which corroborate the trustworthiness of the statement. See Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805,819 (1990).
66. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
394 (1986).
67. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). In White v. Illinois,502 U.S.
at 357, the Court restated the connection of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule, announcing that a statement that qualifies for admission under a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to
its reliability."
68. Roberts,448 U.S. at 65.
69. See White, 502 U.S. at 357
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only to procedures required once a witness is testifying.7 ° Since the
Court has keyed its single reliability standard to traditional hearsay
exceptions, the rationale of the Confrontation Clause now largely
depends on the foundations of the hearsay rule. It is to those
foundations which I now turn, inquiring whether the hearsay rule
rests on the jury, the adversary system, or on other more complex
factors, and to what extent such foundations justify the exclusion of
hearsay in our criminal trials.
E.

Functional and Analytical Arguments
(1) Jury Deception as a Rationalefor Hearsay Exclusion

The traditional justification for the hearsay rule rests on distrust
of lay factfinders, as opposed to professional judges, and on "the
belief that jurors lack the competence to make allowance for the
second-hand character of hearsay."'" This view points to the absence
of the jury as the main reason for the lack of exclusionary rules on
the Continent.72
In the famous Berkeley Peerage Case, Lord
Mansfield contrasted Continental judge trials with English jury trials:
[Where Continental judges determine the facts as well as the law,]
they think there is no danger in their listening to evidence of
hearsay, because when they come to consider of their judgment on
the merits of the case, they can trust themselves entirely to
disregard the hearsay evidence, or to give it any little weight which
it may seem to deserve. But in England, where the jury are the sole
judges of the fact, hearsay evidence is properly excluded,73because
no man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds.
The evidence scholar Starkie contended that in view of the
absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination, juries,
unskilled in weighing evidence, would lack the sound judgment
necessary to avoid placing undue reliance upon hearsay and its
admission would burden the court by opening up collateral issues
such as the character and means of knowledge of the declarant.74
70.

See id. at 358.

See also DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra
note 24, at 31 (citing the conventional justification for the hearsay rule as the perceived
danger that amateur fact-finders might overvalue second-hand information); Langbein,
Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 1194 (arguing that the driving force and "primary
mission of our law of evidence" was and is now "to guard against the inherent weaknesses
of the jury trial").
71.

J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949).

72.

See Robert E. Ireton, Hearsay Evidence in Europe, 66 U.S. L. REV. 252, 252-53

(1932).
73. Berkeley Peerage Case, 171 Eng. Rep. 128, 134-35 (1811).
74. See 1 STARKIE, EVIDENCE 33-46 (1st American ed. 1824). See also Jon Waltz,
Judicial Discretionin the Admission of Evidence Under the FRE, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097
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However, Bentham strongly objected to Mansfield's and Starkie's

view that while judges may be trusted to evaluate hearsay, it is unsafe
to trust the juries to do so.' He proposed to admit the evidence
whenever the declarant is unavailable and then, if in a particular case
deception is apparent from the facts and the verdict, apply the
remedy of granting a new trial which he described as "safe and gentle
as it is infallible."7
A number of contemporary scholars point to the lack of
empirical support for the assumption that juries overvalue hearsay.'
In fact, studies have found that juries in fact do discount for the
weaknesses of hearsay evidence, often excessively so.' Furthermore,
even if juries often misevaluate hearsay evidence, how do we know
that the likelihood of overvaluation is any greater than the likelihood
(1985).
75. He described the asstimption that "if the jury were suffered to hear the evidence,
they would be sure to be deceived by it" as "rash suspicion." 3 BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE 539 (J.S. Mill ed. 1827); see also Chadbourn, supra note 17, at
938.
76. 3 BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 539.
77. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 11, at 378 (asserting that the assumption that juries
cannot properly appraise remote statements is "largely unsupported by empirical
evidence"). Roger Park regards the principle that juries cannot be trusted to properly
evaluate hearsay as assumed despite the lack of empirical data: "My own review of the
literature has failed to reveal any direct study of jury overvaluation of hearsay." Park,
HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 59 n.33.
78. Empirical evidence suggests that jurors are more skeptical of the value and
reliability of hearsay testimony than of eyewitness testimony. See Margaret Bull Kovera
et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703,
706, 719 (1992). In this study, jurors were able to differentiate among accurate and
inaccurate hearsay witnesses, while jurors in this and other studies failed to make similar
distinctions between the testimony of eyewitnesses. See id.
Studies of mock juror decision-making processes suggest that jurors value eyewitness
testimony over hearsay testimony. See Peter Miene et al., JurorDecision-Makingand the
Evaluation of HearsayEvidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 683, 693, 698 (1992). The subjects in
the study rated eyewitness testimony as significantly more important and more reliable
than hearsay testimony. See id. Most jurors believed hearsay evidence was potentially
unreliable and difficult to evaluate and did not report using hearsay in their decision
making process. See id.
Empirical evidence suggests that jurors are not unduly swayed by hearsay testimony,
nor do they perceive that it undermines the integrity of the trial process. See Richard J.
Rakos and Stephen Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings,
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655, 658-64 (1992). Jurors
viewed specific hearsay testimony as no more important, and perhaps less important, than
most of the other evidence. See id. The study concludes that jurors may be competent to
weigh hearsay appropriately and admission of hearsay evidence should not be regarded
"as an automatic blot on the fairness of proceedings." Id.See also Swift, supra note 53, at
496 (reporting that Kalven and Zeisel in their study of the jury concluded that most often
jurors understand the case and follow the evidence and that mistrust of the jury is largely
unjustified).
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of undervaluation? 9 Even if it is, how do we know that the amount
of overvaluation is so great that it is better to do without the evidence
than to hear it? In many cases, any assessment error overvaluing
hearsay might well be minor in comparison to its evidentiary value.8"
Finally, some suggest that contemporary jurors are better
educated and more sophisticated, and therefore less likely than
earlier juries to be mislead or unduly impressed by hearsay
evidence.8 1 However, it is difficult to identify distinctions between
modern and Eighteenth Century juries, much less to know what to
make of them. Certainly, contemporary jurors have more formal
education than jurors of Eighteenth Century England, but does this
lead to a greater capacity to evaluate hearsay evidence? One could
argue that when the hearsay rules were developing in England, jurors
had more experience in evaluating evidence since typically the same
jurors heard numerous cases over weeks or months, unlike the
present situation where usually a juror hears one case and is
dismissed.8 2 Also, while contemporary Americans are engulfed by
the "gross hearsay" of television, the public's general distrust of
government and the media suggests that citizens will not leave their
skepticism toward public officials at home when called to serve as
jurors, particularly with respect to second-hand information from
79. Richard Friedman believes that at times juries may "over-discount" hearsay by,
for example, according excessive weight to a party's failure to produce an unavailable
declarant. Friedman, supra note 15, at 739-40.
80. The danger of slight overvaluation of hearsay would be most significant in those
cases in which the evidence as a whole is so finely balanced that the overvaluation tips the
scales toward an erroneous conviction or acquittal. However, this danger can be reduced
by devices such as jury admonitions and corroboration requirements discussed infra Part
IV.
81. See Hammelmann, supra note 43, at 68 (positing that jurors are no longer what
they were and now bring to their task wide business experience and a far higher general
standard of education); Waltz, supra note 74, at 1097 (noting that the historical rationale
underlying the common law exclusionary rules was the assumption that jurors in a less
sophisticatedtime were ill-equipped accurately to assess the relevance and reliability of
some classes of evidentiary material and might assign substantial weight to some forms of
evidence without pausing to focus on their questionable trustworthiness and the ready
availability of stronger, or at least more thoroughly tested, proofs) (emphasis added):
Jack Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 ("The jury
system no longer presents an insuperable objection .... Jurors are increasingly welleducated and capable, under some guidance from the court, of assessing probative
force."). See also Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthfid, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 95, 110-11, 165 (1996) (Distrust of modern juries is anachronistic since present-day
jurors are far more educated and sophisticated than their predecessors. When the
evidence rules were solidified in the U.S., the number of students graduating from high
school was less than 2%, whereas, a century later, the number had increased 35-fold.
Since presumed juror incompetence regarding hearsay defies empirical verification, the
hearsay exclusion should be eliminated or modified.).
82. See Langbein, Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 1189.
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government sources.
(2) Jury Perfonnanceof OtherDifficult Tasks

Other tasks which we allocate to the jury demonstrate
confidence in jury performance and suggest that distrust of the jury is
not the sole, or even the primary, rationale for exclusion of hearsay
evidence.
(a) Judging Expert Testimony
We ask the jury to judge the weight and credibility of expert
testimony, yet in this task jurors generally are less competent than
when evaluating lay testimony. As Professor Gross has pointed out,
in most cases where experts testify, they are challenged by experts for
the opposition, and juries are called upon to judge credibility and
resolve conflicts." Yet juries tend to use criteria which they apply to
lay witnesses and which may be misleading when applied to expertsthat the expert who appears confident and testifies with certainty is
more worthy of belief than the one who is more cautious and less
definitive, though the latter may be more reliable.' Their strong
suit-ability to evaluate witness bias-is less helpful in the case of
experts since bias often is discounted in light of the fact that experts
are hired by the parties.
(b) Evidence Evaluations
We currently ask the jury to perform magnificent feats of mental
manipulation in the evaluation of evidence. When an item of
evidence has a prejudicial effect as to one issue, but a legitimate
value as to another, such as the case with prior conviction
impeachment and use of character evidence, courts generally assume
that the jury "has the ability to perform the psychological feat of
disregarding the item entirely upon the first issue and of confining its
influence to the second issue."'85 Even in Confrontation Clause
83. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIs. L. REV.1113-20.
84. See DAMASKA, ADRIFt, supra note 24, at 146 (contending that since experts are
chosen to be convincing, ordinary clues to credibility can be misleading).
85. Morgan, supra note 32, at 257. However, the framers of the Federal Rules of
Evidence recognized the inability of jurors to follow limiting instructions in some
contexts. The Rules provide that statements made to a physician for the purpose of
medical diagnosis are admissible as substantive evidence along with the opinion of the
physician. See FED. R. EvD. 803(4). The Advisory Committee rejected limiting their use
to evaluation of the expert's opinion on the ground that "the distinction... [is] one most
unlikely to be made by juries." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note. The
Rules take a similar approach with respect to prior consistent statements. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee note.
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jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has relied on "the almost
invariable assumption" that jurors will follow limiting instructions.86
As long as a co-defendant's confession is not "facially incriminating,"
the Court assumes that the jury will be able to follow the limiting
instructions and not consider any indirect or inferential references to
the accused. 7
Yet when we expose jurors to inadmissible evidence, or evidence
admissible only for a limited purpose, and tell them to disregard the
evidence entirely or to disregard it for the most apparent and
tempting purpose, we ask them to perform the near-impossible task
of erasing a mental imprint of relevant and cogent fact. One study
found that 98% of criminal defense lawyers and 43% of trial judges
believed that jurors were incapable of distinguishing between use of
prior bad act evidence, including criminal convictions, for a limited
purpose such as impeachment, and use to prove guilt. 8
While we generally assume that professionals are better able
than lay jurors to perform the mental separation task,89 there is little
empirical support for this theory. Studies indicate that judges are no
more able than lay juries to avoid over-evaluation of character
evidence.' Damaska believes the lay jury protection argument "no
longer carries much weight" in light of complex instructions on nonuse of hearsay which even professional judges would be hard put to
follow" and points to "the apparent difficulty for any person-lay or
professional-to 'unbite' the apple of knowledge."

86. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987). See also id. at 209 (holding
that the Clause does not bar admission of a co-defendant's confession which has been
edited to remove references to the non-confessing defendant, though the confession
incriminates the defendant inferentially by linkage with other evidence).
87. The Court's assumption that limiting instructions would be successful was based
on the belief that "inferential incrimination" is not as powerful as direct reference to
defendant. Id. at 208. However, in Gray v. Maryland, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997), the Court
held that editing a non-testifying co-defendant's confession by replacing inculpatory
references to a jointly tried co-defendant with a blank space or "deleted," as in
Richardson, invited the jury to "merely fill in the blanks" and violates the defendant's
Sixth Amendment confrontation right.
88. See David Ring, Rush to Judgment: Criminal Propensity Clothed as Credibility
Evidence in the Post-Proposition8 Era of California Criminal Law, 15 WHIrIER L. REV.
241, 247 (1994).

89.

We point to this assumption as a basis for relaxing appellate review of

evidentiary rulings in bench trials.
90. See AKRRY CALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146, 105-17 (1966);

A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 911-15 (1971).
91. Damaska, Of Hearsay, supra note 1, at 457.
92. Damaska, Free Proof and its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 352 (1995)
[hereinafter Damaska, Free ProoJf.
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(c) Evaluation of Weak Hearsay Admitted Under Existing Rules
Many hearsay statements admitted under current exceptions are
no less weakened by traditional hearsay dangers than those which we

exclude,' and many assumptions used to justify our hearsay
exceptions are unsupported by empirical proof. For example, a
number of scholars have agreed that the premise underlying the
excited utterance exception-that people are more likely to speak
accurately when under stress of a startling event-is not supported by

empirical experiments or common sense. 4 While excitement might
diminish one's capacity to fabricate, excitement wears off quickly and
is accompanied by stress which increases inaccuracies in perception.'
Likewise, the assumption underlying the declaration against interest
exception-that a declarant would not likely make a statement

against his own interest unless he believed it to be true-has not been

subjected to exacting empirical scrutiny.' The dying declaration
exception has been described as an example of courts putting aside
traditional concerns with hearsay dangers and placing reception
"frankly upon the ground that the evidence is needed and hearsay is
better than no evidence." 97

93. Bentham argued that the multitude of existing exceptions testified to the safety
of the broad principle of admissibility which he recommends. He contended that
evidence "equally weak" is now admitted under existing exceptions "without objection or
complaint, to an extent, the magnitude of which affords a conclusive proof of a safety with
which this sort of liberty may be allowed." 3 BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 541. Morgan
contended that "[i]f the courts would recognize that much of the evidence which they now
admit as non-hearsay is, analytically, within the hearsay concept, they might be persuaded
to admit other evidence which, though customarily denominated hearsay, in fact raises
the hearsay dangers to no greater extent than evidence now admitted under the hearsay
exceptions." Morgan, HearsayDangers,supra note 28, at 219.
94. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observationson the Law
of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432,436-39 (1928); Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9,
at 75 (stating that "the better view seems to be that excited utterances are less reliable
than unexcited ones"); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay:A Proposalfor a Best
Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893 (1992) (contending that the assumption that
excited utterances are more reliable than ordinary hearsay statement has no empirical
support); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:A Criticism of Present
Law and the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 28 (contending
that the hypothesis underlying the excited utterance exception is "faulty on every score").
95. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 94, at 436-37.
96. See Welsh S. White, Accomplices' Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 753,763 (1996).
97. Morgan, Jury and Exclusionary Rules, supra note 32, at 256. See also Charles W.
Quick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations,6 HOW. L.J. 109, 110-20 (1960) (finding
that the exception for dying declarations is "shot full of inconsistencies and illogicalities").
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(3) Ability to Evaluate Hearsay in the Formal Trial Context

Even if professionals generally are no better than lay people in
evidence evaluation and factfinding, are they better in the artificial
context of the criminal trial where they may be more aware of the
dangers of evidence manipulation by lawyers? Does the adversary
nature of evidence gathering and presentation undermine lay more
than professional ability to properly evaluate hearsay evidence?
Roger Park believes that while jurors may use hearsay intelligently in
ordinary life, they are likely to overvalue it and be mislead in a
formal criminal trial which "is not ordinary life," but "a formal,
ritualized proceeding unlike anything in their ordinary affairs."98
Certainly, the job of weighing a hearsay statement against testimony
that has been subject to courtroom cross-examination "is, obviously,
unnecessary in ordinary life."' However, in the numerous cases in
which hearsay is admitted under an exception, jurors currently have
the task of evaluating out-of-court statements that have not been
subjected to cross-examination against in-court cross-examined
testimony. Also, ordinary life is filled with occasions for evaluating
hearsay accounts of non-percipients against statements of those who
have personally perceived the events and can be questioned by the
evaluator. Park's strongest argument, however, rests on jurors' lack
of appreciation of the weaknesses of our adversary system. He
contends that non-lawyers lack an understanding of "institutional
practices" necessary for the proper evaluation of hearsay, such as
"ways in which professional statement-takers, with an eye to
litigation, can twist and distort without actually lying"'" or how
attorneys can prepare misleading affidavits and "sandpaper"
statements of declarants.' ° These are serious concerns, but they
apply mainly to officially-prepared statements, such as those taken by
police officers or investigators, as opposed to diary entries or
statements to friends or neighbors. Also, since jurors are highly
skeptical of witnesses who are party-paid and produced for litigation
such as informers and accomplices, °2 they most likely would be even
more suspicious of hearsay statements from such persons.
Furthermore, the best response to the problem would be to
98. Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 60-61.
99. Id. at 61. See also Mueller, supra note 11, at 383 (observing that in ordinary life
people rarely are called upon to decide important matters "'based on facts presented by
advocates in a confined time and unfamiliar setting").
100. Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 61.
101. Id. at 61 n.40.
102. See Trott, supra note 36, at 1385 (observing that "[o]rdinary, decent people are
predisposed to dislike, distrust, and frequently despise criminals who 'sell out' and
become prosecution witnesses," and that jurors "frequently disregard their testimony
altogether as highly untrustworthy").
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"sandpaper" the excesses of our adversary lawyering or at least to
educate jurors with respect to these problems by judicial comment or
cautionary instructions such that jurors would be in a better position
to evaluate party-prepared evidence.1 3
(4) Applicationof the HearsayRule to Nonjury Trials
Finally, if jury overvaluation or other misuse of hearsay is the
principal justification for its exclusion, one would assume that
hearsay generally would be admitted in all nonjury trials. As
Professor Morgan argued, "[i]f the hearsay rule were intimately
connected with the jury, there would little reason to apply the rule in
bench trials.""l
However, hearsay routinely is excluded in bench
trials in criminal cases,"0 5 and as will be seen, adversary and other
procedural aspects of our criminal process justify continued
application of the hearsay rule in nonjury trials.
(5) Summary
The traditional view that points to the existence of the jury as
the primary justification for hearsay rules rests on the unproven and
mistaken assumption that people untrained in the law tend to
overvalue hearsay evidence more than professional judges. But
exclusion of hearsay evidence, particularly when not party-created
for litigation purposes, cannot be justified on the ground of distrust of
lay, as opposed to professional, factfinding in view of the application
of hearsay rules to bench trials and the extensive trust which we place
in juries in allowing them to consider numerous forms of hearsay and
non-hearsay evidence, the reliability of which often is more
questionable than many statements currently excluded as hearsay.
Furthermore, the traditional jury-oriented view which assumes
greater ability of professional judges to properly evaluate hearsay
conflicts with how practicing lawyers view judges and juries.
Consider a case in which the prosecution is based primarily on
hearsay evidence, such as an excited utterance, a dying declaration,
or a statement of an accomplice admitted under a catch-all exception.
Would a defense attorney have such confidence in a judge's ability to
103. Dale Nance questions why being exposed to admittedly probative hearsay should
lead to greater inaccuracy, "especially when the information carries on its face a
consumer warning, as it were, by virtue of its derivative status." Dale A. Nance,
Commentary: A Response to Professor Damaska; Understanding Responses to Hearsay:
An Extension of the ComparativeAnalysis, 76 MINN. L. REV. 459, 463 (1992).
104. Morgan, Jury andExclusionary Rules, supra note 32, at 254.
105. Morgan noted that "denial of the right to cross-examine is equally fatal in a case
tried without a jury, whether it be one in which the jury is waived or one in which there is
no right to trial by jury." Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

give appropriate weight to the hearsay evidence, and such fear that
jurors might overvalue it, that the attorney would advise waiving the
right to jury trial? Admittedly the attorney would consider a number
of factors, not the least of which would be the general perception that
judges usually are more case-hardened and conviction-prone than
juries, but I doubt that a practicing lawyer would give much weight to
the view that because the principal prosecution evidence is hearsay, it
would be given less value by a judge than by a jury."
F.

The Adversary System and the Importance of Cross-Examination

An alternative explanation for the hearsay rule in AngloAmerican criminal trials points to our adversary system of justice and
to the importance of cross-examination. Morgan's conclusion that
the hearsay rule is the product of the adversary system of litigation,
rests on the importance he places on cross-examination: Since the
right to cross-examine "isan essential element of an adversary
system"1 °7 and preservation of the right of cross-examination is the
main purpose of the hearsay rule, the hearsay rule must be a
necessary aspect of the adversary method of adjudication. 8 But why
is cross-examination so crucial in an adversary system?
Considerations of fairness and reliability both support the
proposition that when the parties dominate proof-taking, there is a
greater need for cross-examination.
In a system based on a contest between partisan warriors,
fairness demands a certain balance-that each side be able to test the
opponent's evidence-which is not possible with respect to
statements of declarants shielded from cross-examination. This
argument is strongest when parties are able to create hearsay
evidence and choose it over more immediate and reliable forms of
evidence, as for example, substituting statements of victims or
106. Criminal defense attorneys believe that in most cases, a waiver of jury trial
amounts to a slow plea of guilty, and often assume that the increased likelihood of juries
to acquit stems from their greater tendency to discount prosecution evidence. There is no
reason to believe that this discounting would not apply also to prosecution hearsay.
particularly when today's jurors are accustomed to expect live witness testimony and
defense lawyers would pounce on the opportunity to point out the dangers inherent in
untested, out-of-court statements.
107. Morgan, Jury and Exclusionary Rules, supra note 32, at 255 (contending that the
right of a party to cross-examine "isan essential element of an adversary system; it is not
a necessary concomitant of trial by jury").
108. Hammelmann takes a similar view, contending that the aspect of the adversary
system most responsible for the hearsay rule and "the key to the different attitude which
Continental courts have adopted toward hearsay" is the importance which the adversary
system places on party cross-examination of the declarant. Hammelmann, supra note 43,
at 79-80.
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accomplices for their courtroom testimony. However, the fairness
argument underlying the cross-examination right is weakest with
respect to nonadversary-produced statements of unavailable
declarants, for example, a statement to a bystander by a homicide
victim. The proponent did not create the evidence, but took it as
found. Why does a fair fight demand exclusion for lack of crossexamination when, through no fault of either party, it is not possible
to produce better evidence in the form of the declarant and when the
opponent may have other means of attacking declarant's credibility?
In such case, fairness considerations must rest primarily on reliability
problems associated with evidence produced and presented by party
advocates. Reliability concerns also are most serious with respect to
adversary-created evidence. Evidence which has been created or
manipulated by advocates comes to court tainted with partisan
poison which must be purified by the fire of cross-examination. In
such case, cross-examination can be seen as "the essential guarantee
of reliability.""°
(1) ParticularWeaknesses of Hearsay Evidence
Hearsay by its nature as second-hand evidence of factual
assertions is particularly susceptible to creation and manipulation in
the context of party-controlled factfinding. Uncurbed admission of
hearsay poses concerns beyond the four weaknesses embraced within
the conventional untested declarant theory which become more
serious in the context of contentious partisan evidence gathering and
presentation.
(a) Hearsay as Easily Creatable Evidence
Hearsay evidence is easy to create, and unless party-power to
generate admissible hearsay is controlled, admission of partyproduced hearsay easily could shift the focus of the trial to pre-trial
statements and lead to paper trials similar to Continental trials during
the ancien regime.
With the exception of expert witnesses and demonstrative
evidence, most admissible physical and testimonial evidence is "taken
as found" rather than created for use at trial. While parties may
prepare witnesses and seek to shape their testimony, they must, as
prosecutors who present unsavory informants often put it, "take
witnesses as we find them." Hearsay, on the other hand, easily can be
created by the parties through unregulated witness interviews.
Except in limited contexts such as police-conducted, post-accusation
eye-witness identifications and in-custody interrogations of suspects,
109. Id.
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the Supreme Court has not imposed even minimal Constitutional
protections governing the creation of witness statements, whether by
the prosecution or the defense. Consequently, control over party
production and presentation of hearsay primarily rests on hearsay
and other rules of evidence.
(b) Witness-Oriented Dangers
In addition, hearsay, by its character as verbal rather than visual
information, can be more easily fabricated by the in-court witness
conveying it and is less vulnerable to attack by cross-examination.
Despite the opportunity to cross-examine the witness testifying to
out-of-court statements, witness-oriented concerns remain from the
fact the testimony relates verbal, rather than visual information.1 1 It
is an old insight of judges and scholars that an in-court witness more
easily may lie about a verbal than a visual event and that crossexamination is less effective in revealing falsehoods when an in-court
witness is willing to distort, fabricate, or otherwise inaccurately
report an out-of-court statement."11 One who desires to fabricate a
hearsay statement often would be free to choose place and time when
no one was present but the witness and supposed declarant, such that
it would be difficult to show the statement was never made, especially
if the declarant was no longer available. On the other hand, as
Damaska notes, fabrication of seeing something "must be woven into
the fabric of a coherent story, making the exposure of falsehood
somewhat easier.' 1 . Furthermore, there is reason to believe that
memory of verbal events is not recorded and maintained as
accurately as memory of visual experiences.'
Such witness-oriented
110. This duality of hearsay weaknesses was pointed out by the Federal Rules of
Evidence Advisory Committee with respect to statements against penal interest. The
Committee noted in the decisions "a distrust of evidence of confessions of third persons
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of
the making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either instance by the required
unavailability of the declarant ....
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note
(emphasis added).
11i.
See DAMASKA, ADRIFt, supra, note 24, at 80 (citing as an early reference to this
point, Jeffrey Gilbert, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 2: 14, at 890 (Dublin, 1795). In Coleman
v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812), Chief Justice Kent explained, "A
person who relates a hearsay statement is not obligated to enter into any particulars, to
answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain
any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities: He entrenches himself in the simple assertion
that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or absent author." See also
Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 56-62 (warning of the danger that the witness
might distort or manufacture declarant's statements and that in many situations crossexamination would be ineffective in uncovering such false testimony).
112.

DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 80.

113. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 57, and authorities cited in nn.28 &
29. Park also asserts that "[s]ignificant statements are often directed at just one person.
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concerns can be seen in the Federal Rules which more readily admit
hearsay which has been recorded. 4 or is unlikely to be fabricated by

the in-court witness."5

Thus, free admission of hearsay is most dangerous in the context

of party-controlled factfinding. Hearsay by its nature is particularly
susceptible to being manufactured or tainted by the parties or their

attorneys and particularly difficult to attack at trial. Both declarantoriented and witness-oriented

dangers are exacerbated

in an

adversary system of adjudication. Fairness and reliability concerns
therefore closely link hearsay rules to the core of the adversary

system

of

adjudication-party

presentation of evidence." 6

control

over

production

and

(2) PartisanControl over Proof-Taking
Partisan evidence gathering and presentation aggravates both

declarant-oriented and witness-oriented hearsay weaknesses, with
sincerity problems most susceptible to party manipulation. The
extent of such increased hearsay dangers turns on the degree to
while significant events are often observed by many." Id. at 57 n.30. But the difference
more likely lies in the fact that testimony of non-verbal events is more easily corroborated
by physical evidence, and therefore less susceptible to undetected fabrication, than
testimony of out-of-court statements. For example, an informant's testimony that he
observed drugs or guns in defendant's home is more easily corroborated (as by the later
seizure of those items) than the informant's testimony that defendant admitted to dealing
drugs.
In addition, Park points to the limited effectiveness of cross-examination in detecting
fabrication, citing Morgan and other scholars who contend that cross-examination's
principal utility is in exposing faults in memory and perception, and that it is less effective
in revealing insincerity or language ambiguities. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9,
at 61 (contending that exposure of willful falsehood by cross-examination is "very rarely
demonstrated"); see also Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 690-91 (1962). However, this
argument seems less substantial since testimony of informers, accomplices and other biascontaminated witnesses routinely is admitted despite serious sincerity problems.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) and the numerous exceptions listed in Park,
Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 71 n.79.
115. Recent decisions expanding the exception for statements made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis or treatment may rest, in part, on the belief that doctors and other
professionals are unlikely to fabricate statements of their patients and likely to make
some record of them.
116. Of course, dangers presented by the ease of creation and fabrication do not apply
to all hearsay. For example, dangers associated with witness fabrication of out-of-court
statements generally are diminished with respect to statements that are written, recorded,
or otherwise reliably confirmed as made by declarant, such as statements made in judicial
proceedings. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A). Yet firm proof that the statement was
made by declarant, while dispelling witness-oriented dangers, should not necessarily lead
to its admission if serious adversary dangers remain, as for example in the case of a tape
recorded statement of an informer or the grand jury testimony of an accomplice.
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which parties are permitted to prepare witnesses or otherwise shape
their evidence, the powers at their disposal to do so, and the incentive
of parties to select and present hearsay over more reliable first-hand
information. Such dangers vary considerably between the different
legal systems, but are greatest in America where lawyers are given
free rein to shape evidence and manage its presentation and are
highly motivated and aggressive in the pursuit of courtroom
victory.117
(a) Evidence Contamination
Party preparationof testifying witnesses
The danger of party tainting of witness statements and testimony
varies among different common law systems according to whether
they are permitted to coach or otherwise prepare witnesses. The
danger is greatest where the parties and their lawyers and agents are
largely unrestricted in procuring and preparing witnesses-as in the
United States-and less where they are limited by ethical or legal
restrictions-as on the Continent and to a lesser degree in England." 8
Continental practices are founded on the notion that evidence
should be presented to the court in as near to its original form as
possible, "9 such that witnesses are encouraged to testify initially in
narrative, and the "shaping" of their testimony, either in the form of
pre-trial preparation or direct examination at trial, is severely
restricted. 120 Also, in Continental systems evidence processing is
more neutral than in adversary systems where investigation and
evidence presentation is partisan and contentious. In Germany, for
117. Damaska detects "a few signs" that party mastery over factfinding in criminal
cases may be weakening. See DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 138. But to this
author, the trend over the last few decades, at least up to the O.J. Simpson trial, has been
in the direction of greater party dominance in American criminal trials. See generally Van
Kessel, supra note 15, at 425-65.
118. In England, the standard American practice in preparing witnesses is considered
unethical. Except for parties or experts, "gingering up the witness" by counsel is looked
upon with great disfavor in England. While the solicitor may interview and prepare the
witness, a barrister may not. Thus, if the witness is called, "his appearance in the witness
box will be essentially unrehearsed." C.P. HARVEY, THE ADVOCATE'S DEVIL 66 (1958).
The Code of Conduct for barristers provides: "Generally, a barrister should not discuss a
case or the evidence in a case with any potential witness other than the lay client, a
character witness or an expert witness ... A barrister should not rehearse, practice or
coach any witness, in relation either to the evidence itself or to the way in which to give
it." THE GENERAL STANDARDS, CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, IT6.1 (1990).

119. See Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 506, 517-18 (1973).
120.

See William Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A

Comparative Perspectiveon American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37, 42-44 (1996).
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example, prosecutor and defense attorney contacts with and
preparation of witnesses are restricted, and the shaping of a witness'
testimony either by the prosecution or the defense is improper."'
In America, on the other hand, both the prosecution and the
defense actively engage in shaping witness testimony. As Professor
Pizzi has pointed out, in this country, a crime victim's testimony has
to be shaped so that it comports with our rules of evidence and the
goals of the advocates, such that "the United States lies at one
extreme in the way that lawyers are free to manipulate evidence for

presentation at trial."1" With each side preparing and calling its own
witnesses, evidence often seems tainted by the partiality of the
attorneys.
As Damaska puts it, in this "bipolar procedural

environment," the concern that testimony is distorted is greatly

exacerbated. 23

Party threats or inducements
Another important factor is the extent to which parties are able
to pressure witnesses to make statements or to testify. In America,
government informants and turncoats often are threatened with

prosecution and promised relief from substantial prison terms or
property forfeitures if they agree to testify against others. While we

admit and allow the jury to weigh the testimony of such witnesses,
cross-examination is particularly important with respect to witnesses

whose credibility is highly suspect.
121. See id. at 43. It is not the function of the prosecutor or the lawyers for the
defense to seek out and interview witnesses prior to trial. If the defendant or victim know
of other relevant witnesses, their attorney will bring the names of such witnesses to the
attention of the prosecutor who will then have the witnesses interviewed by the police and
the interview will be made part of the case file. See id. at 58-59. See also W. Zeidler,
Evaluation of the Adversary System: As Comparison, Some Remarks on the Investigatory
System of Procedure,55 AUSTL. L.J 390, 396 (1981) (stating that due to the leading role
played by the judge in deciding the nature of the evidence presented, "lawyers are
generally not allowed to examine the witnesses privately before this is done by the
court").
122. Pizzi & Perron, supra note 120, at 44. See also Michael Higgins, Fine Line,
A.B.A.J. 51, 53 (May, 1998) (discussing the "uncomfortable truth" about the American
legal system: that coaxing or helping a witness to lie is a common, yet rarely revealed or
punished, practice of both prosecutors and defense attorneys).
123. Damaska, Of Hearsay, supra note 1, at 431 (contrasting Continental systems
where neutral and official fact-finding activity diminishes the specter of unreliability and
the threat of one-sided testimonial distortions). See also Moskovitz, The O.1. Inquisition:
A United States Encounter with ContinentalCriminalJustice,28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1121 (1995) (certain features inherent in the Continental tradition assure that the factfinder will be presented with reliable, non-partisan evidence and will properly weight the
evidence in a way as to lessen the need for cross-examination and other traditional
adversary safeguards).
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Officially-created hearsay has long been distrusted both in
England and on the Continent," 4 and its use is most dangerous when
the official is a partisan prosecutor motivated to seek a conviction
and empowered to exert tremendous pressures on potential
witnesses. Such cases raise both fairness and reliability concerns.
Concerns relating to balance and fairness recently have been
voiced by post-modernists who point to possible abuse of
governmental power as a justification for excluding hearsay in
criminal cases. Free admission of hearsay, they contend, would
unfairly benefit the government to the detriment of criminal
defendants, who in most cases are the "litigation underdogs."'" The
prosecution generally calls more witnesses and relies on hearsay
more often than criminal defendants, 26 and police and prosecutors
ordinarily have greater powers to coerce witnesses and distort
statements, as well as greater powers both to obtain the presence of
witnesses on their behalf and to dissuade witnesses from appearing
on defendant's behalf. The disparity between government and
defense power to obtain and shape witness testimony is common
knowledge among criminal law practitioners. Defense attorneys
often complain that prosecutors and other law enforcement officials
in preparing their witnesses use suggestive techniques to mold or
strengthen their testimony. In the Oklahoma City bombing case,
Michael Tigar, the lead attorney for defendant Terry Nichols,
complained that "the government has a room at the Marriott Hotel in
which witnesses are transmogrified.
I wish I had a room in where I
' 27
could do that to people.'
Confrontation and hearsay rules are particularly important in
controlling prosecutorial overreaching in the creation and production
of testimonial evidence from informers and accomplices. Officially124. Even in non-adversary systems one finds a distrust of officially-produced
hearsay. The history of Continental limits on hearsay evidence supports the view that the
greatest skepticism should be directed toward officially-produced witness statements and
their use in criminal cases should be carefully limited. The first Continental restrictions
on the most egregious use of hearsay evidence, known as "immediacy in the formal
sense," grew out of resentment over trials based on official dossiers compiled by
investigating judges. Damaska, Of Hearsay,supra note 1, at 446-47. Modern Continental
restrictions of secondary evidence are directed primarily against the substitution of
officially-compiled written hearsay for in-court testimony of available witnesses. For
example, the German immediacy principle is limited to official documents and "aimed at
preventing 'official' mediation between the decisionmaker and informational sources,"
although general justification requirements tend to inhibit the use of secondary evidence
when original evidence is available. Id. at 449-56.
125. Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 65.
126. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 493-94 (2d
ed. 1982); ZUCKERMAN, supra note 23, at 181.
127. N.Y. TIMES, January 4, 1996, § 1, at 7.
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produced statements from such persons usually are accusatory,
blame-shifting, and made in anticipation of litigation. Their
accusations, even in the form of live witness testimony conveying first
hand knowledge, have long been distrusted, and for good reason.
Usually, such persons are involved in criminal activities and hope to
receive some benefit from incriminating others so are motivated to
conform their statements to what they believe the listener, usually a
police officer or prosecutor, would like to hear and what would bring
them the greatest rewards. As Lord Abinger put it in 1837, "[t]he
danger is that when a man is fixed, and knows that his own guilt is
detected, he purchases impunity by falsely accusing others."1 A
federal court of appeals judge and former federal prosecutor recently
put it more directly: "Criminals are likely to say and do almost
anything to get what they want, especially when what they want is to
'
get out of trouble with the law."129
They are manipulative and
devious and would not hesitate to commit perjury or manufacture
evidence. The most dangerous informer is the jailhouse snitch who
claims defendant confessed to him. "Sometimes they tell the truth,
but ' more
often, they invent testimony and stray details out of the
130
air.

Distrust of such evidence is an old story and was an important
factor leading to the increased importance of cross-examination and
the ascendancy of the adversary system. Ancient English practices
such as the law of approvement and the crown witness system, which
provided favorable treatment to suspects who agreed to testify
against their accomplices, brought about convictions based on
dubious evidence.13 ' By the Eighteenth Century, recognition of these
problems gave rise to the corroboration rule with respect to
accomplice testimony,132 the confession rule, and other exclusionary
128. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 2057, at 358, § 2059, at 362 (citing Regina v. Farler,
173 Eng. Rep. 418,419 (Worcester assizes 1837)).
129. Trott, supra note 36, at 1382.
130. Id. at 1394.
131. See Langbein, Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 1184-1198.
132. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 2056, at 351. Wigmore placed development of
the corroboration rule at the end of the eighteenth century, id., but John Langbein's
research led him to believe that the rule was in force by 1751. See Langbein, Ryder
Sources, supra note 43, at 98.
The corroboration rule declares that the bare, uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice is not thought of as sufficient credit to put a prisoner upon his defense. See 2
W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 609 (T. Leach ed., 6th ed.,
London 1787). Henry Fielding believed that the corroboration rule hampered law
enforcement and wanted it watered-down such that it would not be enforced by threat of
directed verdict and prevent the evidence from putting the accused to his defense, but
applied only after all the evidence has been presented. See H. FIELDING, AN ENQUIRY
INTO THE CAUSES OF THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS 111-17 (London 1751).
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rules of evidence. Langbein concludes that the relatively sudden rise
of the law of evidence and of adversary trial procedure was, at least
in part, a response to system that "encouraged false witnesses, who
found it all too easy to bring about the condemnation of innocent
men."'3
Dangers of admitting government-produced accusatory
statements made in anticipation of litigation has been recognized by
American judges and scholars,'3 4 and was a factor in the formulation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'35
Recent changes in the areas of sentencing and plea bargaining in
America have greatly enhanced the power of prosecutors to pressure
suspects and defendants into giving evidence against their
accomplices or others suspected of criminal activity. Our prosecutors
traditionally have operated unrestrained in their charging
decisions,'36 and although plea bargaining decisions usually are
133. Langbein, Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 2, 96-98, 129 (explaining that distrust
of accomplice evidence produced by expectation of rewards also contributed to the
eighteenth-century shift toward the adversary system, the first ingredient of which was the
presence of lawyers whose primary responsibility was cross-examination of witnesses).
However, Langbein later emphasized the need for jury control resulting from
depowerment of judges as a reason for the development of hearsay and other
exclusionary rules. See id. at 1196.
134. Justice Harlan was "prepared to hold as a matter of due process that a confession
of an accomplice resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be introduced as
evidence of the guilt of an accused." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Professor Welsh White would enlarge Harlan's "bright line rule" to exclude
under the Confrontation Clause any statement contained in a "confession of an
accomplice resulting from formal police interrogation." White, supra note 96, at 759, 78384 (1996). Professor Roger Park advocates a general unavailability requirement in
criminal cases "when the prior statement is accusatory or when one might reasonably
expect that cross-examination would serve a useful purpose," and proposes that,
regardless of unavailability, there should be a firm rule against prosecution use of
accusatory statements of accomplices or informants "made while in custody or under
interrogation." Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 108. Professor Richard Friedman
contends that the Confrontation Clause should "exclude evidence of an out-of-court
statement offered by the prosecution regardless of declarant's availability, if the declarant
made the statement with the anticipation that it might be used in the investigation or
prosecution of a crime and the accused has not had an adequate opportunity to examine
the declarant." Friedman, Game Analysis, supra note 15, at 725-26.
135. The version of the Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted by the Judicial
Conference to the Supreme Court in 1971 contained a provision that would have excluded
"a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused." The Supreme
Court struck this provision from the rules transmitted to Congress. The limitation was
reinstated in the House, but deleted in the Senate and was not enacted. See Park.
HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 108 n.228.
136. See generally Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). Prosecutors occasionally indict for the primary purpose of
pressuring the accused to testify against another. The Ninth Circuit recently held that the
indictment of defendant's son and his wife for the purpose of pressuring them to testify
against defendant did not constitute unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. See United
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subject to court approval, courts have allowed prosecutors to apply
tremendous

pressures

against

defendants-to

the

extent

of

threatening the ultimate penalty-and have relegated judges to a
limited role in the area of plea bargaining.137 Also, the movement
toward determinate sentencing and increasingly punitive sentences

has greatly enhanced prosecutorial powers.'38 Not only has the
charging decision become more significant, but the increased
importance of criminal histories has allowed prosecutors to exert

greater pressures on those with criminal track records-often the
least reliable witnesses. For example, in California the existence of a

prior serious or violent felony conviction brings an additional and
consecutive five year term.139 If the prior qualifies as a strike, the
primary sentence is doubled, and if the defendant has suffered two
such strikes, the sentence is twenty five years to life."4 Under threat

of such severe sentences, motivation to falsely incriminate others can
be enormous.
Constitutional guarantees governing police interrogation of

suspects offer limited protection against use of unreliable statements
against other suspects. First, a defendant lacks standing to suppress
hearsay statements or in-court testimony of an accomplice on the

ground that the accomplice's constitutional rights were violated in
the course of police interrogation which produced the statements or
impelled the testimony.'
Also, the principal constitutional

protections applicable to police interrogation practices do not
directly serve the function of assuring reliability. The Supreme Court
has expressly disavowed reliability as the goal of Due Process and
States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997).
137. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Mabry v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 504 (1984); United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985).
138. See generally Symposium: Making Sense of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 25
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563-771 (1992).
139. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1998); People v. Superior Court
(Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
140. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1998). Contrast the situation on
the Continent where sentences generally are not as severe and plea bargaining in serious
cases is generally prohibited. Furthermore, Germany and some other countries operate
under the principle of legality which somewhat restricts prosecutorial charging powers by
mandating prosecution whenever sufficient evidence is present.
141. Constitutional rights are personal and can be asserted only by the victim of the
violation. See United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81 (1993) (a defendant may urge
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment "only if that
defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure"). Furthermore, federal courts are not authorized to use
either due process or supervisory powers to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on
the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party, even though the government
conduct may have been outrageous or offended canons of decency and fairness. See
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,737 n.9 (1980).
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Fifth Amendment protections. The Court has rested the Due Process
involuntariness rule on the need to deter undesirable police behavior
and to maintain an accusatorial system of justice and has warned
against even considering the probable truth or falsity of a contested
confession in determining voluntariness.142
This guarantee is
unrelated to the question of guilt or innocence and has "nothing
whatever to do with improving reliability of jury verdicts."' 4'
The
Court recently emphasized that the "sole concern" of both Due
Process and the Fifth Amendment is to deter government coercion,
rather than to assure that statements of suspects are either reliable or
the product of the suspect's free will:'" "The aim of the requirement
of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true
or false."' 4 5 Thus, the government can exert tremendous pressures on
suspects and accomplices to incriminate others with little fear that
constitutional violations occurring in this pressure-cooker process can
be claimed by those incriminated.
(b) Evidence Selection: The Hearsay Rules as an Instrument of Lawyer
Control
Although the adversary system usually encourages the parties to
produce the most immediate and reliable evidence available, 46 at
times partisan self-interest will motivate parties to rely on hearsay or
other forms of second-best evidence in preference to in-court
testimony.'4 7 Absence of restrictions on hearsay evidence would
142. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-49 (1961). Involuntary confessions
are excluded, the Court reasoned, "not because such confessions are unlikely to be true,
but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the
enforcement of criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial systema system in which the state must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured and may not, by coercion, prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth." Id.
143.

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972) (rejecting the argument that the

reasonable doubt standard is violated if the voluntariness of a confession is proven only
by a preponderance, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the voluntariness rule is to
prevent an accused from being compelled to incriminate himself by his own statements).
144. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
145. Id. at 167 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 394 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
146. Jurors bring to the courtroom "expectations about what proper proof should be,"

and if such expectations are not satisfied, "triers of fact may penalize the party who
disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against that party." Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 654 (1997) (quoting Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978)).
147. See Roger C. Park, Character Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson Case - or,
Rationales of the CharacterEvidence Ban, With Illustrationsfront the Simpson Case, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 747, 774 (1996) (observing that "[o]ften the pressures of the adversary
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tempt police to produce more written evidence in sanitized form on

which prosecutors could place greater reliance, and would tempt
defendants 4to fabricate exculpatory hearsay statements of absent
declarants.1 1
Thus, hearsay rules serve as a check on party incentives to rely

on hearsay in preference to first-hand information and as an

inducement to produce the most direct evidence available. 49 In this
function, the rule serves as a procedural tool which induces the

parties to seek and present live witness testimony rather than secondbest evidence and deters them from creating misleading or deceptive

evidence, such as witness affidavits which in large part are shielded
from effective courtroom attack. Like the exclusionary rule in cases
of unlawful searches and seizures, the hearsay rule acts as a deterrent,

not in punishing a party, but in removing incentives to act
However, the hearsay rule goes beyond simple
improperly.
"production-deterrence" and also serves the function of "creationdeterrence" which, as in the case of eye-witness identification rules,

aims at preventing distortion or contamination of evidence. In this
way, restrictions on hearsay "deter" the parties from creating tainted

and untrustworthy hearsay.' 0

This inducement-deterrent rationale is most weighty with respect
to statements of declarants whom the hearsay proponent is able to
call as a witness and is weakest as to statements of homicide victims
and other unavailable declarants. Some judges and scholars have

advocated a rule of preference which would apply only to hearsay
which is second-best evidence in light of the availability of the

declarant.'

Certainly, the lawyer-control justification for the

system will encourage the parties to seek the best evidence anyway, but this will not
always be true"). See also Strier, supra note 81, at 105 (concluding that juries are
manipulated by trial lawyers who hide relevant evidence and present only evidence which
favors their interests and that "all evidence introduced in a party-controlled adversarial
proceeding must, to some extent, be suspect").
148. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1362; Criminal Law Revision Committee
Evidence Report 132 (1972).
149. "New Wave" theorists view the hearsay exclusion as "a way of... influencing
the conduct of police and of prosecutors in the process of preparing and preserving
evidence." Park, New Wave Scholarship,supra note 9, at 365.
150. The inducement-deterrent rationale is most important as a restriction on
prosecution production of hearsay, but also applies to creation of defense hearsay,
particularly in the context of statements of a defendant who is shielded from testifying by
the Fifth Amendment privilege.
151. Dale Nance suggests that we would "move our law in a more respectable
direction" if we focused on the inducement rationale and "continued to cleanse the
remaining elements of taint theory from our law of hearsay." Nance, supra note 103, at
472. Peter Westen advocates an approach to the Confrontation Clause as set forth by
Justice Harlan in Californiav. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), where he divided hearsay into
statements made by an available declarant and statements made by an unavailable
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hearsay rule is strongest when lawyers have the option of producing
first-hand witnesses, but admitting all hearsay statements of
unavailable declarants would open the door to adversary-created
statements of informers who disappear, co-defendants who refuse to
testify, and confessions made to defendant's investigator by third
parties who cannot be located. At the least, such free admissibility
surely would reduce incentives to locate some witnesses. At worst, it
would tempt lawyers to conveniently "lose track" of witnesses who
may be particularly vulnerable to cross-examination. Also, with
respect to witnesses who may become unavailable, such as foreign
visitors or those facing impending death or deportation, the hearsay
rules provide an incentive to prosecutors to expedite the trial or use
evidence-preserving methods such as depositions or preliminary
hearings at which the witnesses may be cross-examined.
Free
admissibility of unavailable declarant statements would reduce or
eliminate these incentives.
(c) Distrust of Defense Hearsay
The inducement-deterrent rationale also applies to defendant's
use of hearsay evidence. The direct connection doctrine which limits
"third party culpability" evidence"' is based on the suspicion "that
criminal defendants may find it all too easy to fabricate [such
evidence] which may bamboozle juries into erroneous acquittals."'5 3
Defendants would find it even easier to substitute out-of-court
statements for third party testimony. These concerns support the
limitation in the Federal Rules exception for statements against
interest which excludes from admission a statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability when offered to exculpate the
declarant. Where the declarant is available, such evidence would be subject to the
Confrontation Clause, making the Clause a preferential rule mandating the presentation
at trial of the best evidence available. Where the declarant is unavailable, hearsay
statements would be subject to the minimal standard of the due process clause that bars
evidence only if there is a substantial likelihood that it is false. See Peter Westen, The
Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979). Michael Seigel sees the main
hearsay problem as "the propensity of parties to substitute it for live testimony to gain a
strategic advantage," and proposes a "blanket rule subject to exceptions" which would
admit hearsay if it is "the best evidence available to the offering party from a particular
declarant's source, or if the best evidence has been or will be presented to the trier of
fact." Seigel, supra note 94, at 915 n.69, 928-930. However, he would apply further limits
in criminal cases. See id. at 944.
152. Evidence offered by an accused to prove that another person committed the
crime charged is admissible only if the evidence directly connects that person to the
commission of the crime. See David McCord, "But Perry Mason Make it Look So Easy!":
The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone

Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 917, 919 (1996).
153. Id. at 980.
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accused "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
'
Suspicions of fabrication rest
trustworthiness of the statement."154
both on concerns over the making of the statement and over the
accuracy of its contents. 155
In terms of producing evidence, the defendant already has the
option of not personally giving testimonial evidence by refusing to
make pretrial statements during custodial interrogation and of
refusing to take the stand at trial. In neither case can the judge or
prosecutor ask the jury to consider the defendant's silence.'5 6 If the
defense were given the additional advantage of shielding its witnesses
from questioning by introducing their hearsay statements, the
defense might more easily present a fabricated defense impervious to
attack which would increase the danger of erroneous acquittals.
Even more serious concerns arise with respect to defendant's
own exonerating statements. Under present rules, statements of an
accused generally are inadmissible when offered by the accused
unless offered for a non-hearsay purpose, such as the basis for expert
opinion, or shown to fall within an exception. In most cases,
defendant must take the stand and submit to cross-examination in
order to personally present his or her story to the jury. Yet because
of the threat of impeachment by prior convictions, the safe harbor of
Griffin's'57 no-comment rules, and other considerations, it appears
that defendants are not taking the stand as they once did.'5 8 Rules
barring defense hearsay at least provide some inducement to the
accused to take the stand. If the defendant could freely introduce the
accused's own prior exonerating statements, particularly ones
prepared and packaged by defense counsel, the defense could quite
easily introduce the story of the one potential witness who usually
knows more about the events than anyone else, but who is far from
unbiased and cannot be tested by cross-examination.
(d) Contentiousness of Lawyers
Finally, hearsay dangers from party-controlled factfinding are
increased by the partisanship and contentiousness of lawyers, and
154. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
155. The Advisory Committee noted in the decisions "a distrust of evidence of
confessions of third persons offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of
fabrication either of the fact of the making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced
in either instance by the required unavailability of the declarant .... " FED. R. EvID. 804
advisory committee's note..
156. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
157. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
158. My own informal survey of California criminal lawyers suggests that in some
jurisdictions over one-half of criminal defendants in serious cases refuse to testify.
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American criminal trial lawyers are more aggressive and contentious
than either Continental or English advocates.
Our courtroom
lawyers often regard the trial as ritualized aggression, viewing
themselves as prize fighters or semantic warriors in the verbal battle
in pursuit of that most important goal-winning the case.159
Continental and English advocates also like to win, but for a variety
of reasons, including less responsibility for evidence presentation,
reduced incentives to win, and greater restraints on advocacy, they
generally do not place as much importance on victory, and they do
not pursue it as aggressively." 6 In America, controls on creation and
presentation of hearsay evidence are particularly important in light of
the extreme motivation of lawyers to achieve courtroom victory and
their great powers over the investigation and presentation of
evidence.
G. Hearsay Rules as a Check on the Independent Factfinder
Although procedural aspects of the adversary system appear
more responsible for the hearsay rule than distrust of the jury,
Morgan nonetheless recognized that jury distrust was responsible for
"not a few" exclusionary rules of evidence, and by characterizing
Thayer's dictum that the English law of evidence is "the child of the
jury" as "not more than half-truth," '' Morgan implied that it might
be at least "half-truth." As discussed earlier, assumptions of judicial
supremacy in evaluating hearsay evidence enjoy little support in
experience or reason. Nevertheless, justifications for limits on
hearsay can be found in procedural characteristics of common law
systems associated with the common law jury which threaten the
legitimacy and integrity of verdicts. In particular, the lack of checks
on factfinding by such procedures as judicial guidance during
evidence processing, justification requirements, and meaningful
appellate review constitute additional rationales for exclusion of
hearsay evidence. Thus, Morgan's partial-truth connecting the jury
trial to the hearsay rules stems from their function as a protector of
verdict integrity in light of the largely uncontrolled Anglo-American
factfinder.
(1) Three Threats to Verdict Integrity
The

independent,

unchecked

Anglo-American

factfinder

159. See Van Kessel, supra note 15, at 435.
160. See id. at 437. The tempered advocacy of Continental lawyers is a natural result
of the fact that, in view of the dominance of the Presiding Judge, the cases are not

regarded as the lawyer's to win in the first place.
161.

Morgan, Jury and Exclusionary Rules, supra note 32, at 258.
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threatens the integrity of verdicts in three ways. First, our passive
trial judges increase the danger of jury misevaluation of hearsay
evidence.'62 American trial judges often have limited knowledge of
the facts before trial,'" and appellate courts discourage trial judges
1
from engaging in significant or extensive questioning of witnesses.
Judges who become "overly aggressive in managing or directing
important elements of lawsuits" will be reversed on appeal.'A
Furthermore, judicial authority to summarize or comment on the
evidence is severely restricted.'" In most states, judges in criminal
trials are prohibited from expressing an opinion on the weight or
credibility of the testimony of witnesses or on the merits of the
case. 67 Judge Marvin Frankel accurately described the current
approach when he noted that "[i]t is not a regular thing for the trial
judge... meaningfully to 'comment upon' the evidence."'

This was not always the case in common law trials. Langbein
pointed out that prior to the advent of the adversary system in the
latter part of the eighteenth century, the active judge could influence
162. See generally Van Kessel, supra note 15 at 426-35 (discussing the extreme judicial
passivism and lawyer dominance in American criminal trials).
163. While the judge may gain information from pretrial motions, plea bargaining,
and other informal discussions, there is no regular procedure, as there is in England,
whereby the judge receives prosecution committal papers or other case file materials. See
Doran et al., Rethinking Adversarinessin Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
27 n.117 (contrasting English with Scottish procedure in this regard).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 440 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1974) (warning that in general the trial judge would do better to
forego direct questioning, and the possible impact on his objectivity, since he has
available the alternative of suggesting to counsel the questions he believes ought to be
pursued).
165. Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice,
21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 806 (1988).
166. See Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 12 AM. JUD. SOC'Y 76, 78-81
(1928); Weinstein, The Power and Duty of FederalJudges to Marshall and Comment on
the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on ChargingJuries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 165
(1988). Contrast the wide latitude of English judges to sum up and comment on the facts.
See Wolchover, Should Judges Sum Up on the Facts?, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 781,783-84.
167. See 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 8 (Tillers rev. 1983); Wolchover, supra note
166, at 784.
168. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth'An UmpirealView, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1042;
see also Wyzanski, a Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REV.1281,
1283 (1952). As approved by the Supreme Court in 1972, the Federal Rules of Evidence
allowed the judge to "fairly and impartially sum up the evidence and comment to the jury
upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses," but Congress struck
the rule after the House Committee on the Judiciary recommended its deletion. The
Committee noted that the authority of the judge to comment on the weight of evidence
and credibility of witnesses was "highly controversial" and was "not granted to judges in
most State courts." H.R. REP. No. 150, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1973) (report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary concerning superseded FED. R. EVID. 105).
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and correct jury verdicts in advance of accepting them.' 69 But as the
adversary system developed, the verdict was left to a body of persons
untrained in the law and largely unguided by neutral legal
professionals, contributing to the need to protect the integrity of
verdicts through hearsay and other exclusionary rules of evidence.
Second, in criminal cases the factfinder, whether judge or jury, is
not required to justify its verdict. Factfinder unaccountability is a
basic tenet of Anglo-American criminal procedure, which demands
the return of a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. Courts allow
special interrogatories to civil juries,7 ° but disfavor them in criminal
trials on the ground that their use would undercut defendant's right
to trial by jury.'7 ' Thus, a criminal jury cannot be required to provide
either an account of the evidence or the reasoning supporting the

verdict.'

Even in criminal bench trials judges usually are not

required to make explicit findings of fact or to otherwise justify their
verdicts,'73 and "reasoned judgments ...appear to be the exception
169. See Langbein, Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 1195. He explains that the judge's
awesome power of comment and instruction resulted in verdicts that were "collaborative
products" entailing "deep judicial involvement." Langbein contended that the rise of
adversary procedure broke up the working relationship between judge and jury. As
lawyers took on a more active role, judges became more passive. Id. at 1197-98. During
the nineteenth century, there was a celebration of cross-examination involving what
Langbein characterized as a "naive faith in [its] truth-serving efficiency" together with a
growing deference to lawyer domination of trial, resulting in the destruction of the judge's
control over the trial and over jury verdicts. Id. at 1199-1201.
170. In Federal civil trials the court must "find the facts specifically and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
171. The First Circuit declared that "not only must the jury be free from direct control
in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous and
subsequent" and condemned the use of special interrogatories upon the ground that they
could be used by the judge "to carefully guide the jury to its conclusion." United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-82 (1st Cir. 1969); cf United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24
(1st Cir. 1989). The Constitution demands that the defendant be afforded "the full
protection of the jury unfettered, directly or indirectly." Spock, 416 F.2d at 182.
172. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (judges and other officials are prohibited from
inquiring into reasons underlying jury verdicts). Directing the jury to provide reasons for
its decision would violate the principle that criminal juries return general verdicts and
may not be required to provide the reasons behind their verdicts. See Gray v. United
States, 174 F.2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1949); See also Spock, 416 F.2d at 181. English rules
are even stricter and provide that juries "are neither required nor allowed to give reasons
for their verdicts." ZUCKERMAN, supra note 23, at 33 (emphasis added).
173. Damaska contends that with the decline of the jury and increase in bench trials,
the need for exclusionary rules of evidence to compensate for the opacity of jury verdicts
is lessening because in bench trials "the basis for the court's judgment is authoritatively
documented in findings of fact and conclusions of law." DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note
24, at 128. However, in federal non-jury trials, findings of fact are required only on
request made before the general finding, FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c), and many states do not
require specific findings in nonjury criminal trials under any circumstances. See Doran.
supra note 163, at 46 n.191. Contrast Diplock courts in Northern Ireland where a single
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rather than the rule."'74 Since Anglo-American criminal trial
verdicts are given without a reason, appellate review is difficult.
Finally, both pre-trial and post-trial opportunities to check the
reliability of evidence are limited in common law proceedings.
Admission of hearsay is particularly troublesome in those common
law jurisdictions that require little pre-trial discovery and depend
entirely on the traditional common law clash of opposing forces in a
single episode. In such context, there may be little opportunity to
obtain the presence or investigate the credibility of a declarant when
at trial a hearsay statement springs out of the adversary hat.
Damaska contends that the greater dangers of manipulation of
evidence and surprise in concentrated proceedings is one explanation
for common law hearsay rules. 75 When rules restricting use of
secondary evidence were developing, English trials were rapid "oneshot" proceedings in which there was little pre-trial preparation and
no appeal, allowing few possibilities for inquiry into the basis for
secondary evidence.'76 Continental criminal proceedings, on the
other hand, were continuous with trials as merely one stage in an
ongoing process which afforded ample opportunity to probe into
questionable evidence, such as obtaining the original of a suspicious
document or investigating or producing the maker of a hearsay
statement. While the extremes of these divergent styles have been
abandoned by Anglo-American and continental systems,"7 Damaska
believes that they help explain why attitudes toward use of secondary
evidence remain more cautious in Anglo-American trials and more
lenient in Continental trials.178
Of course, a common law jury trial can never be as flexible as
Continental trials before professional judges or even mixed courts
where cases more easily can be continued or returned to the
prosecutor or magistrate for further investigation, but hearsay
dangers are particularly acute in jurisdictions that do not provide for
effective pre-trial mutual discovery, which allows parties the
judge is factfinder and must provide a reasoned judgment in support of a decision to
convict. See i at 11-13.
174. Doran, supranote 163, at 46.
175. See Damaska, Of Hearsay, supra note 1, at 428. Post-modernists also point to
the danger of surprise as a justification for exclusion of hearsay evidence. See, e.g.,
Mueller, supra note 11, at 390; Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 62.
176. See Damaska, Of Hearsay, supranote 1, at 428-30.
177. See DAMASKA, ADRiFT, supra note 24, at 60 (explaining that common law
countries have gradually dethroned trials by engaging in extensive preparatory activities
and lengthy appellate review).
178. See Damaska, Of Hearsay, supra note 1, at 430. However, Damaska believes
that "this rapprochementis less than first appears." The common law trial still stands far
apart from other stages, whereas continental trials are still "a mere stage in a continuing
procedural effort." DAMASKA, ADRIFr, supra note 24, at 60.
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opportunity to check out the reliability of hearsay and reduces the
dangers of evidence manipulation and surprise. In America, there is
considerable diversity in discovery rules among the states and no
significant uniform Constitutional standard. Aside from the limited
category of exculpatory evidence material to the defense,'7 9 "[t]here is
no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case....,,18
The Supreme Court recently pointed out that while an accused has a
Due Process right to notice of the charges, an accused has no right to
notice of the evidence which the state plans to use to prove the
charges.'
Thus, dangers posed by the problem of surprise very
much depend on the notice and discovery rules of the particular
jurisdiction or trial court. However, such dangers are diminishing
with the trend toward greater discovery in criminal cases.18
Post-trial checks on reliability pose more serious problems, since
jury misuse of hearsay in Anglo-American trials is extremely difficult
to correct in light of low sufficiency standards limiting challenges to
convictions and double jeopardy rules barring prosecution appeals
from acquittals. The common law's low sufficiency standard has an
ancient lineage. Prior to the Enlightenment, England's lack of
complex rules of evidence and its low standard of proof contrasted
sharply with restrictive Roman-canon standards on the Continent,
and has been cited as a reason the English did not resort to judicial
torture prevalent in Continental inquisitory systems.'8 3 Over a
Century ago, Jeremy Bentham remarked,
There can be few if any cases in which a man can be put to torture
under Roman law upon less evidence than would be sufficient to
convict him by the English.
The direct evidence of one
179. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1976) (finding a violation of due
process in the sentencing authority's consideration of confidential information
undisclosed to the accused).
180. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Federal courts disagree as to
whether the trial court has discretion to order the prosecution and defense to exchange
witness lists and summaries of anticipated witness testimony in advance of trial. See
United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (making "explicit" the rule that "a
district court that orders the Government and the defendant to exchange witness lists and
summaries of anticipated witness testimony in advance of trial has exceeded its authority
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"). But see United States v.
Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1996).
181. See Gray v. Netherland, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (1996).
182. See infra Part III.D..
183. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND
ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 80 (1977) [hereinafter Langbein, Torture]. Langbein

contends that on the Continent it was the straitjacketing evidence rules, rather than the
system of judicial inquiry, that lead to torture, and it was the low jury standard of proof
that spared England from it. See id. at 184 n.20. But see S. LANDSMAN, THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 8, 13-14 (1984) (contending that
English reliance on the jury allowed England to avoid use of torture).
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unexceptionable witness, which would be sufficient to warrant the
convicting him by the English Law, by the Roman Law would only
warrant the putting him to Torture.184

Even today English sufficiency standards are no higher.1 85 A
defendant can be convicted on any single piece of evidence, even a
single piece of hearsay, if it is a kind which falls within an
exception. 186 Furthermore, when hearsay is admitted, English law
treats it as of equal weight with any other type of evidence. A court
of appeal has expressly held that a trial judge should not direct the
jury to give a statement admitted as documentary hearsay under the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988 less weight than the testimony of live
witnesses." 7 In fact, the recent Law Commission studying the English
hearsay rule voiced concern that a person might be convicted on
unreliable hearsay evidence alone.18 In America also, remedies for
convictions or acquittals on the basis of insubstantial or
uncorroborated hearsay are extremely limited. Lax sufficiency rules
offer slight hope of overturning convictions based on slim evidence,8 9
184. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 IRELAND LEGAL Q., 305,333 (1973).
185. Langbein asserts that "[t]o this day an English jury can convict a defendant on
less evidence than was required as a mere precondition for interrogation under torture on
the Continent." Langbein, Torture, supra note 183, at 78.
186. In Nembhard v. The Queen, 1 WLR 1515 (1981), the Privy Counsel upheld a
murder conviction despite the fact that the only evidence against the defendant was the
victim's dying declaration.
187. See R.V. Kennedy, 1992 CRM. L. REv. 37-40.
188. See Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 138 pt. 4, at 58, 4.67 (1995).
189. Most federal and state courts follow Wigmore's presumption against rules which
require a certain number of witnesses or even corroboration of a single witness. See 7
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2034, at 342 (Chatbourn ed. 1978). For example, in 1960 the
California Supreme Court ruled that an extra-judicial identification that cannot be
confirmed at trial is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction in the absence of other
evidence tending to connect defendant with the crime. See People v. Gould, 354 P.2d 865,
870 (Cal. 1960). However, the Court in 1995 abandoned this corroboration standard and
adopted the general view that an out-of-court identification of a witness can be sufficient
by itself to support a conviction even in the absence of other evidence connecting
defendant to the crime as long as the identification was "reasonable, credible, and of solid
value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." People v. Cuevas, 906 P.2d 1290, 1295 (Cal. 1995).
Avenues of federal collateral review of state criminal convictions are even more
limited. A federal district court may grant habeas corpus relief only "if it is found that
upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The
1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act further prohibits federal courts
from granting habeas corpus relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state courts
unless the adjudication "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, federal courts on habeas are
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and the prosecution has no remedy if the factfinder chooses to acquit
on the basis of insubstantial hearsay. 19° Thus, our constitutional
double jeopardy restrictions on prosecution appeals justify our
greater reluctance to freely admit defense hearsay than in
Continental systems. The danger that unrestricted admission of
hearsay evidence would encourage jury lawlessness in using
insubstantial hearsay as a peg upon which to hang their bias or
emotional hat" is a serious concern in American trials.
(2) Comparative Perspectives

Contrast Continental systems where unexplained judgments are
anathema and both the prosecution and the defense may appeal."9
Judges are required to justify their decisions in a written opinion
making clear not only what facts the court has found but also what
items of evidence support each finding and what chains of inference
lead from these items to specific factual determinations.193 Written
judgments are subject to supervision by appellate courts' 94 such that
Continental rules requiring courts to disclose grounds for decisions
both deter reliance on weak evidence and facilitate review. In

required to defer to state court determinations concerning sufficiency of evidence to
support a conviction, and a writ of habeas corpus may issue for evidence insufficiency
only if state courts have failed to engage in reasoned, good-faith decision making when
applying the "no rational trier of fact" test. See Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192,198-99
(7th Cir. 1997).
190. A convicted or acquitted defendant cannot be prosecuted again for the same
offense. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Compare the current
restrictions with the prosecution's ability to challenge erroneous evidentiary rulings which
lead to acquittals in state courts prior to incorporation of the Fifth Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). However, an acquittal means only that
the defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and, at sentencing for
another crime, the prosecutor may prove facts underlying the acquitted offense by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997).
191. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 63 (citing such danger as one of the
complex process-based concerns).
192. See DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 45, 128 n.10 (explaining that
articulation of reasoned judgments is obligatory and is among the basic postulates of
procedural fairness on the Continent).
193. See id. at 45.
However, written justification requirements vary among
Continental countries and are strongest in Germany and Holland. See J.F. Nijboer, FactFinding in Dutch Criminal Procedure,in INT'L. SEMINAR ON EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION,
1,8 (1993).
194. See DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 45. Damaska observes that
articulation of reasons makes exercise of adjudicative power less impenetrable and
provides a dissatisfied party with a stationary target, but cautions that the effectiveness of
appellate review of such reasons tends to be overestimated as a corrective for trial court
errors. See id. at 45-46, 128 n.10.
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addition, interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights, 195
the European Court on Human Rights has limited courts of member
states from convicting solely on uncorroborated hearsay even when
the declarant is unavailable.1"
(3) Summary

Hearsay rules in America both compensate for "cryptic and
enigmatic verdicts" 1" and substitute for meaningful checks on the
reliability of verdicts. Since there are few integrity controls at the
back-end of common law criminal trials, hearsay and other rules of
evidence serve as front-end protections against future error by
excluding evidence that might be overvalued or otherwise misused by
the factfinder' 98
It is tempting to point to the common law jury as the source of
this difficulty. Damaska contends that the difficulty of requiring
amateur factfinders to give reasoned opinions" in conjunction with
the need to prevent factual error and to shore up verdict legitimacy
explains why policing receipt of evidence is more important in
common law systems and "may be the single most neglected
contribution of the jury to the rational for" Anglo-American
195. The Convention provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the
right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the assistance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him." Art. 6(3)(d).
196. See Unterpertinger v. Austria, Series A, No. 110 (1987) (finding that Article 6
was violated from use of out-of-court statements as proof of the truth of the accusations
and as the main evidence to support the conviction when the defendant at no time had the
opportunity to question the witnesses and the judge had refused to allow applicant to
adduce evidence to cast doubt on their credibility); Sa'di v. France, September, Series A,
No. 261 C (1993) (finding a violation of Article 6 when the conviction was based solely on
pre-trial statements of persons whom the accused had no opportunity to confront and
there was no additional prosecution evidence to corroborate the statements). Compare
Asch v. Austria, April, Series A, No. 203 (1991) (finding no violation of Article 6 when
out-of-court statements did not constitute the only item of evidence on which the firstinstance court based its decision, although it was not possible to question the declarant).
197. DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 41 (contending that unexplained jury
verdicts suffer from a legitimacy defect and conflict with the assumption that those
exercising authority in a democracy are expected to provide reasons for their conduct).
198. See Langbein, Ryder Sources, supra note 43, at 1195 (describing modem hearsay
and other exclusionary rules as "essentially prophylactic, in that they seek to prevent
error by excluding information that might mislead the jury in view of the fact that in
modem practice it is quite difficult for the judge to correct error in a jury verdict once it
has occurred). See also Damaska, Of Hearsay,supra note 1, at 429 (noting "the absence
of regular mechanisms for reviewing factual findings" in modem Anglo-American trials
and concluding that "since the quality of verdicts could not be checked ex-post, the
English system was driven to exercise great caution" in admitting questionable evidence).
199. See DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supranote 24, at 44.
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evidence law." ° Yet the jury is not the sole culprit. With greater
judicial influence over jury evaluation of evidence and broader
avenues of appeal which provide meaningful checks on verdict
integrity, arguments for extensive common law style hearsay would
be weakened. Furthermore, input controls on hearsay evidence are
needed also in bench trials since a professional judge's overvaluation
of hearsay may equally endanger the integrity of a verdict in view of
the lack of justification requirements, low sufficiency standards, and
unavailability of prosecution appeals.2"' Nor is the divided court
alone responsible. Theoretically, in bench trials one judge could
decide admissibility questions while another judge, or a panel of
professional judges, could decide the issue of guilt. Yet ex post facto
checks on reliability of verdicts would remain limited by the absence
of a written opinion justifying the decision, the lack of de novo
review, low sufficiency standards, and double jeopardy prohibitions
on prosecution appeals.
Thus, the theory that the jury is at least one foundation for our
hearsay rules does not rest primarily on differences between
evaluative abilities of lay and professional factfinders. The very
institution of the jury as an unguided body without responsibility to
justify its decision which is not subject to appeal by the prosecutor or
de novo appeal by the defendant accounts for some of our hesitancy
to abandon the hearsay rule in criminal cases. 2 With respect to the
use of lay factfinders, the different approaches to hearsay lie, not so
much in the different capacities of lay and professional factfinders to
accurately evaluate hearsay, as in procedural differences which in
Anglo-American adversary systems create a greater need for
restrictions on hearsay. The extent that the existence of the jury calls
for exclusion of hearsay has more to do with its traditional nature as a
200. Id. at 46.
201. If the principal foundation for exclusion of hearsay rests on procedures
associated with the adversary system rather than on distrust of the jury, the relaxed
attitude toward hearsay in bench trials may not be appropriate. However, such relaxation
may be partially explained by the fact that bench trials may be more easily continued for
further investigation and generally are less adversary because of greater judicial control.
See Doran, supra note 163, at 28-29, 49-50 (contending that bench trials are less
adversarial since the judge takes a more active role). Also, although common in trials of
minor crimes, non-jury trials are rare in serious criminal cases. Although some states
provide the right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions, under the United States
Constitution, there is no right to a jury trial where the possible imprisonment is not more
than six months. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989); Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
202. Damaska points to the lack of justification requirements and other devices aimed
at preventing factual error and shoring up legitimacy of inscrutable verdicts as possibly
"the single most neglected contribution of the jury to the rationale for" Anglo-American
evidence law. DAMASKA, ADRIFT, supra note 24, at 46.
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single proceeding with limited pre-trial discovery in which a largely
unreviewable decision is given without a reason than with the danger
of jury, as opposed to judicial, overvaluation of hearsay evidence.
H. Options and Proposals
A. The Option of Procedural Modifications

Since adversary and other procedural aspects of our system of
adjudicating criminal cases provide the main foundation for our
hearsay rules, might procedural modifications lead to a reduced need
for restrictions on hearsay? Certainly, we might strive toward
reducing the degree of party control over the investigation and the
presentation of evidence by limiting the power of parties to influence
witnesses while increasing pre-trial discovery and creating
independent checks on the integrity of verdicts. Admission of
hearsay would be less troublesome where rules mandate effective
mutual pretrial discovery, the power of lawyers to create and shape
evidence is circumscribed, trial judges are more active in controlling
the power and contentiousness of lawyers while guiding the jury by
admonitory instructions pointing out the weaknesses of hearsay
evidence, and both trial and appellate courts check the integrity of
jury verdicts by enhanced corroboration and sufficiency rules. 3
However, as I have discussed elsewhere, Constitutional standards,
professional inertia, and other factors stand as insurmountable
barriers to significant reforms in our adversary or jury trial systems,
With little hope of procedural
at least in the near term.'
restructuring, presently we must be content with rules restricting
admissibility of hearsay evidence to a greater degree than in England
or continental systems.

203. For example, admission of hearsay seems less troublesome in England where
lawyers are more constrained and judges more active. Witness interviews by barristers
are limited, and shaping witness testimony is prohibited. Barristers generally are less
contentious in their zeal to win at all costs, with prosecutors, by reason of restrictions on
their plea bargaining powers, enjoying less freedom to influence witness testimony
through threats of severe sentences. Finally, the English trial judge is more influential by
reason of the judge's authority and duty to summarize and comment on the evidence. See
Van Kessel, supra note 15, at 425-448.
204. See Van Kessel, supra note 15, at 487-510. "[Ijnstead of speaking of a floor of
Constitutional protection, the Court's procedural boundaries in the trial context can be
more accurately viewed as walls which prohibit any lateral movement toward procedures
foreign to us, but accepted throughout most of the world." Id. at 487-88.
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The Need for Consistency and Predictability

Should admissibility standards remain categorized or left to
judicial discretion with appropriate guidelines? Damaska contends
that both the Roman-canon law that tells the judge that "this is
reliable evidence and you must attach a certain weight to it" and
common law which says "this is bad evidence and you may not
consider it," are based on the same erroneous assumption that it is
possible to tell in advance the impact on the factfinder of particular
evidence or classes of evidence."' A number of evidence reformers
who advocate loosening the hearsay rule share this view.2
However, courts and legislatures in common law countries have
recognized the importance of articulated standards, and we in
America have a special need for consistency and predictability in
light of the prevalence of plea bargaining which largely stems from
efforts to avoid lengthy, burdensome criminal jury trials. American
scholars, judges, and practitioners have voiced concerns over the
dangers of unbridled judicial discretion, 0 7 and promotion of
205. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers,supra note 119, at 515 n.10.
206. McCormick proposed that hearsay should be "inadmissible accept where the
judge in his discretion finds it needed and trustworthy." Charles T. McCormick, The
Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930). Michael Fenner advocates
adoption of "real world" hearsay rules in which hearsay would be inadmissible except
when the court, based on both the need for and the reliability of the out-of-court
statement, decides otherwise." G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking
Truth About Hearsay, 62 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (1993). See also Seigel, supra note 94, at
915 n.69, 916 (contending that the law is incapable of rationally making pre-determined
categorical evaluations of the usefulness or reliability of hearsay evidence). However,
Seigel goes on to do just that in creating exceptions to his "blanket rule."
Eleanor Swift criticizes the current categorical approach to hearsay exceptions as
based on unsupported and unverifiable generalizations about the reliability of declarants
and their statements and proposes a "foundation fact" approach in which the hearsay
proponent is "obligated to produce a process foundation witness knowledgeable about the
circumstances at the time the declarant perceived, remembered, and made her
statement." Eleanor A. Swift, A FoundationFact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1339, 1350-52, 1358 (1987). She would rely primarily on jury, rather than judge, to
evaluate the trustworthiness of hearsay and believes that "the trier is able to evaluate
weaknesses in declarant's statements and is the proper institutional actor to do so." Id. at
1427 n.308. Swift recognizes adversary dangers and the importance of requiring the
production of foundation facts with which the jury can fairly evaluate hearsay evidence:
"Were hearsay admitted freely, proponents could minimize foundation fact and
foundation witnesses production to suit their tactical needs. This would undermine the
accuracy of adjudicative fact finding .... Id. at 1427. However, her complete trust in
jury evaluation of hearsay without limits or guidelines would raise concerns relating to
consistency and predictability and pose dangers relating to adversary-produced hearsay.
207. Wigmore believed that guidance by detailed standards was needed by the bar "in
order to prepare competently before trial along normal expected lines" and by both bench
and bar "in order that a normal routine may be ordinarily followed, by common
understanding, for speedy dispatch at trials, without uncertainty and dispute." John H.
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consistent and predictable evidence rulings was a major objective of
the Federal Rules of Evidence."°8 The Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee that drafted the Rules demonstrated considerable
dissatisfaction with an open-ended standard'
and eventually
abandoned an illustrative approach1 ° in favor of a list of 29
categorical and two residual exceptions.2 1'
In adopting the
categorical approach, Congress narrowed the residual exceptions by
adding a number of limitations to the ability to admit hearsay not
falling within traditional categories. 212 Furthermore, the Supreme
Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J.
23, 26 (1942). Wigmore objected to what he viewed as the "broad abstractions" of the
ALI's Model Code of Evidence, arguing that it amounted to "a sacrifice to the fetish of
Judicial Discretion." Id. at 27. However, Wigmore advocated guidelines which would be
"directory, not mandatory," and preferred that the detailed standards should be viewed as
"guides, not chains." Id. Roger Park's objections to radical hearsay reform in criminal
cases were based in part on fear of uncontrolled judicial discretion and unpredictable
standards that would make trial preparation more difficult and increase the danger of
unfair surprise. See Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 62-63.
Even Damaska fears that lifting restrictions on admissibility of hearsay in our system
"could usher in unstructured judicial discretion in the treatment of derivative proof'
which would operate largely unchecked by effective review procedures. Damaska, Of
Heasrsay, supra note 1, at 457 (contending that general admission of hearsay in AngloAmerican systems would have "a stronger 'liberating' effect than in continental
procedure where courts are more restrained by justification and sufficiency rules in the
use of secondary evidence).
208. See Hochman, supra note 12, at 687.
209. In its First Draft published in 1969, the Committee rejected Judge Weinstein's
proposal that all class exceptions be abolished in favor of case-by-case treatment of
hearsay. See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, PreliminaryDraft of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D.
161, 328 (1969) [hereinafter PreliminaryDraft]; see also Weinstein, The Probative Force
of Hearsay, 4 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961). Judge Weinstein suggested procedural
safeguards in the form of notice of intent to use hearsay, free comment by the court on
the weight of the evidence, and more authority on the part of trial and appellate judges to
deal with evidence on the basis of weight. See Weinstein, supra, at 338-42. But the
Advisory Committee determined that Weinstein's approach would vest too much
discretion in the trial judge, minimize predictability, and make trial preparation difficult.
See PreliminaryDraft,supra,at 327.
210. The Advisory Committee initially took an illustrative, rather than categorical,
approach in which both Rules 803 and 804 provided a non-exclusive set of examples of
situations in which hearsay would be admissible. See PreliminaryDraft,supra note 209, at
324-25.
211. See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates,51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
212. The House Committee on the Judiciary struck these two exceptions on the
ground that they would create too much uncertainty in the law, but the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary reinstated them with additional criteria which became part of the final
version which emerged from Congress. See S. REP. No. 1277, at 18-19 (1974), reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065-66. The Senate Committee stated that it "does not intend
to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall
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Court's hearsay and confrontation decisions demonstrate a concern
for clarity and predictability and a skepticism toward enlarging
judicial discretion with respect to admission of hearsay."'
Finally, although the complexity and irrationality of current
hearsay rules has been severely criticized, 21 4 a considerable body of
opinion regards the rules as working "tolerably well" in practice. 1
In view of the recognized need for consistency and predictability and
the absence of any perceived crisis in rule application, it would not be
fruitful to seek elimination of the categorical approach to hearsay in
favor of general standards of reliability and necessity. However,
adjusting our rules with a fresh focus on hearsay's primary
foundations would be both possible and productive.
C.

Guidelines: An Adversary-Oriented Danger Spectrum

Focusing on the nature of the statement and context in which it
was made, it is possible to formulate an adversary-oriented danger
spectrum in which the most serious concerns arise from admission of
hearsay which was (1) adversary-created, that is, elicited or induced
by the party-proponent (such as statements of witnesses to police,
prosecutors, or defense investigators) and (2) not recorded or
otherwise verified as actually made by the declarant such that the
within one or the other exceptions .... It is intended that... the trial judge will exercise
no less care, reflection, and caution then the courts did under the common law in
establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule." Hochman, supra note
12, at 693. Furthermore, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's proposal for a broad
exception covering statements of recent perception of unavailable declarants. See
proposed FED. R. EvID. 803(b)(2).
213. The Court's focus on the Confrontation Clause, rather than the Due Process
Clause, and its use of established hearsay rules to define the confrontation right
represents a search for workable rules. In its hearsay jurisprudence, the Court recently
rejected a relevancy-balancing approach, cautioning that it would involve considerable
judicial discretion, reduce predictability, and increase the difficulty of trial preparation.
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995) (holding that Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common law's temporal limitation that prior
consistent statements of a witness are admissible as non-hearsay only if made before the
alleged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive).
214. See Maguire & Morgan, supra note 17; see also, Seigel, supra note 94, at 894
(concluding that there is a remarkable degree of consensus among evidence scholars that
the present hearsay rules are irrational to the point of suffering from "intellectual
bankruptcy").
215. See Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783, 838 (1990); Park.
Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 52 n.9 (listing authorities); Weissenberger, supra note
51, at 1527 (citing jury studies suggesting that the system "is not all that bad"). See also
Fenner, supra note 206, at 101 (arguing that while the rules are a disaster, their
application is not, and that we should merely "identify what is actually being done
and.., call that the solution").
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factfinder must rely on the credibility of the in-court witness.
The first factor focuses on party activity as the source of
declarant's motivation for making the statement, the character of
which will vary from case to case. Adversary-created statements
(elicited or induced by a party) usually will be adversary-motivated in
the broad sense that when making the statement, declarant
anticipates future legal proceedings. However, the nature and degree
of the motivation will vary from the usual crime victim or impartial
witness who makes a statement understanding that legal action may
follow, but anticipating no rewards, to accomplices or informers who
incriminate the accused hoping for government benefits.216 The
greatest dangers arise from statements which are made both in
contemplation of legal proceedings and in fear of punishment or
hope for advantage as the result of party threats or inducements, such
as accusatory or blame-shifting statements of accomplices or
informers. Arguments for exclusion are strongest with respect to
unverified, adversary-created statements made in anticipation of
litigation and motivated by prosecutorial pressures.
An adversary orientation also may be used in applying the
second factor. In the usual adversary-creation context, a party
induces a statement from an absent declarant; but a party may induce
a witness to testify to nonadversary-created statements of another, in
which case verification that such statements actually were made may
be problematic. For example, when an informer who hopes for
favors from the government testifies to conversations with
defendant's accomplice or non-testifying co-defendant, admission of
such statements, even if nonadversary-created, may be dangerous if
the statements were not recorded or otherwise verified and the
factfinder must rely solely on the credibility of the in-court witness.217
Of course these factors are not of equal significance, and
exclusion of hearsay should not be limited to contexts in which they
216.

It may be difficult to determine whether the declarant contemplated legal

proceedings when making the statement, particularly when declarant is unavailable. In
today's litigious society the remote prospect of litigation frequently is on everyone's mind.
However, the primary focus should be on whether the statements were made with hope of
obtaining some benefit or with an eye to influencing the course of future legal actions,
that is, motivated by adversary considerations.
217. In the Oklahoma City bombing trial against Terry Nichols, the prosecution
indicated that it would offer the testimony of Michael and Lori Fortier with respect to
conversations they had before the bombing with Nichols' former co-defendant Timothy
McVeigh, who later was convicted at a separate trial. See Jo Thomas, Second Bombing
Trial Has Same Charges in a New Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1997, § 1, at 16. Although
these statements were not party-created, it is unlikely that they were recorded, and there
may be few assurances that they were actually made by McVeigh. In such case, it may
make sense to limit admission of nonadversary-created statements to those qualifying for
admission under traditional hearsay rules, such as co-conspirator statements.
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conjoin.2 18 However, it is in the context of statements induced or
elicited by the parties or their agents that the threat of partymanipulation and contamination is greatest and the deterrent
rationale strongest, particularly with respect to prosecution-created
hearsay. Statements to police may be least reliable, especially when
induced by threats or promises. Yet there seems to be a trend toward
regarding statements to government officials as more trustworthy.
For example, the new "Simpson exception" to the California hearsay
rule admits statements that were made in writing, electronically
' thereby placing
recorded, or "made to a law enforcement official,"2 19
prosecution-created hearsay on a par with statements verified by
recordation."' At the other end of the spectrum are nonadversarycreated statements which can be reliably produced in court.
Arguments for exclusion of hearsay have much less force with respect
to statements which were made to persons other than the parties or
their agents, made prior to or during the events in controversy and
not in contemplation of litigation, and which were recorded or
otherwise preserved for reliable in-court presentation.
This adversary-oriented standard generally would admit most
statements once introduced under the out-dated label "res gestae"
and now viewed as nonhearsay or covered under what Roger Park
characterizes as "transactional exceptions
such as present sense
impressions or excited utterances.
Park describes transactional
statements as "part of the same general transaction or occurrence as

218. For example, mere verification that statements were actually made, such as with
grand jury testimony or police-recorded statements of accomplices, should not guarantee
their admission if they were adversary-created.
219. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(5) (West Supp. 1998).
220. The English documentary hearsay exception for statements of unavailable
declarants also treats statements to the police more favorably. The Criminal Justice Act
of 1988 provides that a statement to a police officer or similar law enforcement official
may be admitted by demonstrating that the declarant "does not give oral evidence
through fear or because he is kept out of the way." § 23(3). Omitted from the new
provision is the previous requirement of showing that the declarant was "kept out of the
way by means of the procurement of the accused or on his behalf" which required that the
act must have been done by the accused or by his agent and with his approval. See
Criminal Justice Act of 1925, § 13(3); see also case cited in Di Birch, Documentary
Evidence, 15 CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1989). This leaves the prosecution free to claim that the
declarant fears to testify and to offer his written statement in place of his oral testimony.
The court in exercising its discretion under Section 25 could require a nexus between the
accused and declarant's absence, but the Act does not require the court to do so. See
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 23, at 219.
221. Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 74.
222. However, admission of excited utterances would rest on the fact that such
statements were not adversary-created, rather than on the controversial assumption that
statements are more reliable when uttered under stress of excitement.
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independently admissible nonverbal conduct,"' and believes that
their admission reflects two considerations: that they will not come
as a surprise since most likely they will be discovered during ordinary
pre-trial preparation and the chance of fabrication by the in-court
witness is less since such statements occur at the same time and place
In
as other conduct which forms the basis of the litigation.'
addition, as noted by Professor Mueller, such statements generally
are uttered before the forces that generate litigation have
strengthened and come into conflict.' Thus, such statements usually
suffer less from dangers associated with party-controlled factfinding,
as well as escaping weaknesses associated with surprise and
credibility of the in-court witness. -6
However, an adversary-oriented standard would not be as liberal
as the Benthamite-style reform proposed by the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Evidence, which would freely admit
hearsay whenever the declarant is unavailable, 7 nor would it go as
far as the less radical reform proposed by the Uniform Rules of
Evidence a decade later which excepted from the hearsay rule
statements of unavailable declarants "narrating, describing or
explaining an event or condition which the judge finds was made by
the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived
by him and while his recollection was clear...

."'

While the

Uniform Rules required that the statement be "made in good faith
prior to the commencement of the action,"" apparently recognizing
the dangers of admitting party-created statements which were made
in contemplation of litigation, they did not limit admission to
nonadversary-created statements.
The second important factor, which might be critical in close
cases, focuses on whether the statement was recorded or otherwise
verified as actually made by the declarant such that the factfinder
need not rely solely on the credibility of the in-court witness. The
Federal Rules now recognize the importance of this factor in hearsay
223. Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 74.
224. See iclat 75-76.
225. See Mueller, supranote 11, at 390.
226. For a contrary view which focuses on declarant-oriented dangers and advocates
the elimination of all res gestae-type exceptions, see James Donald Moorehead,
Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae Reliability, 29 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 203 (1995).
227. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942) ("Evidence of a hearsay
declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as witness,
or (b) is present and subject to cross-examination."). The radical nature of this proposal,
at least in part, was responsible for the fact that no jurisdiction adopted the Model Code.
See authorities cited in Park, HearsayReform, supra note 9, at 53 n.11.
228. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) (1953) (superseded 1974).
229. Id.
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exceptions manifesting a preference for recorded statements130 and in
the description of prior witness statements admissible as nonhearsay
when made under oath at a "trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in
a deposition. '" 23' Of course, some recordings are better than others,
and both the reliability of reproductive method and the general
importance of the verification factor will vary from case to case.2
D. Notice Requirements to Guard Against Surprise
As discussed previously, serious dangers associated with surprise
production of hearsay statements arise in those jurisdictions that lack
effective pre-trial mutual discovery rules. However, such dangers are
diminishing with the trend toward greater discovery in criminal cases.
Where, as in California, mutual discovery rules require both the
prosecution and the defense to disclose in advance of trial names and
statements of witnesses and other evidence the parties intend to
present, dangers from surprise are considerably diminished. Also,
the residual exceptions of the Federal Rules of Evidence require
notice "of the statement and the particulars of it," including the name
and address of the declarant, sufficiently in advance of trial to
provide the adverse party "with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet
it. 2 33 These or similar hearsay discovery rules should be sufficient
protection against surprise, but should be a condition for admission
of all hearsay, particularly statements falling outside categorical
exceptions.
E.

Corroboration and Sufficiency Standards

Furthermore, corroboration and sufficiency standards should be
established to insure verdict integrity in light of the absence of checks
on the independent and unaccountable factfinder. With respect to
both hearsay admitted under specific exceptions and nonadversarycreated hearsay admitted under a residual exception, the judge
should, in balancing probative value against the danger of unfair
230. See Park, Hearsay Reform, supra note 9, at 71 n.79 (listing a number of
exceptions applicable only to recorded statements).
231. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a). The new English exception for documentary
hearsay also reflects diminished concerns with in-court reproduction with respect to
recorded statements.
232. For example, Michael Graham proposes expanding the category of prior
statements of witnesses admitted as non-hearsay to any statement written or signed or
accurately recorded or acknowledged by the witness as his own. See MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 257-58 (1985). Yet a written statement may be more
easily distorted or manipulated by statement-takers than testimony of the witness at a
judicial proceeding.
233. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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prejudice and other factors, 4 require that the hearsay be reliable by
reference to its nature, the circumstances of its creation, or other
evidence in the case.
Most statements falling within specific
traditional exceptions, as well as most nonadversary, "transactionbased" statements, would be found reliable by reason of their
inherent characteristics. However, corroboration should not be
limited by the Idaho v. Wright" standard of "indicia of reliability by
virtue of [the statement's] inherent trustworthiness." 6 In terms of
hearsay reliability, it is not productive to distinguish between intrinsic
and extrinsic corroborating factors. In fact, evidence extrinsic to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the. statement may be
stronger proof of statement reliability, and, ultimately, verdict
integrity, than the context in which the statement was made. The
statement of a kidnap victim describing the interior of defendant's
home or of a sexual assault victim describing unique private physical
characteristics of the accused would be highly reliable if the
statement were proven to conform to the actual facts and the
declarant was shown to be incapable of knowing these facts by other
means. Such probative hearsay should not be excluded merely
because corroboration was not based entirely on the context in which
the statement was made.
Finally, although hearsay evidence may be too powerful to
exclude, alone it may be too weak a foundation on which to sustain a
conviction. 7 Thus, in those very few cases in which a hearsay
statement constitutes the principal evidence against the accused, we
should enhance sufficiency rules in order to further guard against
unjust convictions. For example, we might require that the statement
be clearly corroborated by independent evidence such that the judge
also is convinced of defendant's guilt."8
Under an elevated
sufficiency standard, the degree of corroboration demanded would
increase with the importance of the hearsay evidence in the
234. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
235. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
236. Id.at 822. The Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring that a
statement not falling under a traditional hearsay exception possess "indicia of reliability
by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to-other evidence at trial." Id.
237. See Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring
FoundationalTesting and CorroborationUnder the ConfrontationClause, 81 VA. L. REv.
149, 158, 173 (1995) (seeking to resolve this dilemma by interpreting the Confrontation
Clause to require that the judge make an independent foundational finding that all
prosecution hearsay is both internally reliable in terms of the Idaho v. Wright standard
and independently corroborated). See also Seigel, supra note 94, at 942 (suggesting a
corroboration requirement as to prosecution evidence in criminal cases where even best
evidence hearsay might be too risky a foundation upon which to rest a conviction).
238. The judge could weigh the evidence as a "thirteenth juror" as is currently the
practice in some states. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119,122 (Tenn. 1995).
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prosecution's case. A hearsay statement, whether or not falling
under a traditional hearsay exception, and whether or not adversarycreated, simply is too thin a reed on which to sustain a conviction
unless clearly and firmly corroborated. 3 9
F.

Applications of the Adversary-Oriented Standard

I have attempted to demonstrate that our hearsay rules are
unreasonably restrictive, particularly with respect to nonadversarycreated statements of unavailable declarants in criminal cases.
Neither the adversary system nor the jury supports exclusion of
reliably preserved and corroborated statements of unavailable
declarants not elicited or induced by agents of the offering party or
otherwise made in contemplation of legal proceedings.24 °
Current federal and state rules of evidence could be rewritten to
focus primarily on adversary and verdict integrity concerns, but such
wholesale revision is highly unlikely. However, a fresh focus on such
concerns might guide legislatures in the adoption of new
interpretation of existing hearsay exceptions. For example, as noted
earlier, the new "Simpson exception" to the California hearsay rule
demonstrated appropriate concerns with witness-based dangers in
requiring that statements be in writing or electronically recorded, but
disregarded adversary-oriented dangers by including statements
"made to a law enforcement official.""
Furthermore, courts should focus primarily on adversary and
verdict integrity concerns when interpreting and applying the present
hearsay rule and its exceptions, particularly residual or "catch-all"
exceptions. In most contexts, this should lead to greater admission of
hearsay on behalf of both the prosecution and the defense. In
general, exclusion of probative hearsay is not justified merely by
distrust of jury evaluation abilities in terms ordinary declarantoriented weaknesses, unenhanced by adversary dangers. However,
we should continue to exclude hearsay which is particularly
susceptible to dangers inherent in our super-adversary system.
The following applications of an adversary-oriented standard
suggest admission either under a new exception or a broadened
residual category designed for the purpose of "catching all"
nonadversary-created statements, particularly those of unavailable
declarants, provided the court finds the statements sufficiently
239. In light of double jeopardy guarantees, it is more difficult to guard against unjust
acquittals.
240. The proponent, of course, should shoulder the burden of establishing these
foundational facts.
241. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1370(a)(5) (West Supp. 1998).
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corroborated and probative under Rule 403 balancing standards.
Applications of the adversary-oriented approach are clearest with
respect to "transactional-type" statements of murder victims which
are made to persons other than government agents. While some
would fall under traditional hearsay exceptions, many would not, yet
such statements often are highly probative and often the best
evidence available on a material issue. Thus, adversary-oriented
perspectives would lead to reassessment of some accepted
distinctions.
(1) TemporalDistinctions-LookingForwardor Backward
Standard hearsay doctrine distinguishes between statements of
intent looking to the future24 2 and statements of fact looking to the
past. 243 The statement of a homicide victim that she plans to go out to
dinner with the accused on the evening 9f her demise generally is

admissible to show her intent or plan to go out and that she in fact
did go out with the accused. 2 " But her statement of past events
would be inadmissible when offered to prove those events
occurred. Thus, Jane's statement to her roommate, "I'm going out
to dinner with Frank tonight" would be admissible to prove her
intent and to permit the inference that she carried out her plan with
Frank.' However, couched in terms of past events, admission of her
plan would be more questionable-for example, had she said, "Frank
and I arranged to have dinner tonight" or "Frank and I met at Bill's
Bar and agreed to have dinner together tonight." 247 Assume further
242. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
243. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
244. This majority view relies on dicta in Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96 (suggesting that
statements of intent to engage in future conduct with another can be used to prove the
other's conduct as well: "The letters [of Walters] were competent.., as evidence that,
shortly before the time when other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had
the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that
he did go, and that he went with Hillmon ....). See, e.g., United States v. Annunziato,
293 F.2d 373, 376-77 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Houlihan, 871 F. Supp 1495, 1500-01 (D. Mass. 1994); see also
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.15 (2d ed. 1995).
English law is to the contrary. See R. V. Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox C.C. 171
(excluding as inadmissible hearsay in a murder trial the victim's written statement in her
diary that she had an assignation with the accused on the night she was killed); see also
CROSS ON EVIDENCE 172 (Tapper rev., 7th ed. 1990); Di Birch, supra note 220, at 17.
However, written statements of unavailable declarants now may be admissible under the
exception for documentary hearsay. See supra note 221.
245. See Shepard,290 U.S. at 105-06.
246. See People v. Alcalde, 24 P.2d 627,631 (Cal. 1944).
247. Weissenberger explains the general rule by the implied assertion theory, but
admission of an express statement of prior arrangement for future action is difficult to
justify under this theory. See Weissenberger, supra note 246.
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that Jane was fatally poisoned at dinner, but did not become ill until
the following evening. During breakfast the day after dinner, Jane
said to her roommate, "I went out to dinner with Frank last night."
Clearly, this statement would not qualify as an expression of state of
mind,2 48 and likely would be inadmissible unless brought within a
catch-all exception. This is so whether offered by the prosecution in
the trial of Frank or by the defense in the trial of Dave to prove that
the victim was with Frank when she was poisoned. Yet the result
seems reasonable only to those confined to a narrow declarantoriented hearsay analysis. While the four traditional hearsay dangers
are present and cannot be checked by cross-examination, the
statement was not adversary-created and, with the declarant clearly
unavailable, it may be the best indication of her whereabouts at the
critical time. Furthermore, the statement was not accusatory,
intended to shift blame, or made in anticipation of litigation. Also
important is whether the statement was written, recorded, or
otherwise verified as actually made. Arguments for admission of
Jane's statement would be stronger if she had written it in her journal
or had spoken before a number of independent witnesses. However,
the main focus should not be on whether the statement looks to the
past or to the future but on whether the statement was adversarycreated and sufficiently corroborated. Despite traditional declarantbased hearsay dangers, the hearsay rule should not normally exclude
corroborated, nonadversary-created statements, particularly when
written, recorded, or otherwise verified as made.
Thus, the fact that a statement is accusatory should not alone
lead to exclusion of nonadversary-created statements. Assume Jane
made the statement after she began to feel ill and added, "I'm feeling
sick. I believe that Frank has poisoned me." The accusatory portion
of the statement clearly would not be admissible under the state-ofmind exception.2 49 Yet the statement was not adversary-created and,
if corroborated and verified as made, should be considered for
admission under a residual hearsay exception. Defendants also might
benefit from the more liberal standard. For example, had she stated
to her roommate, "My boyfriend and I had a great time yesterday; he
is so good to me" or "I just had lunch with my cousin Betty; I think
she has poisoned me," the defendant-boyfriend should be able to use
248. Merely a statement of memory or belief.
249. The state of mind exception specifically excludes "a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed." FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See Shepard.
290 U.S. at 105-06 (holding inadmissible a similar statement by defendant's wife to her
nurse in his prosecution for her murder, and warning that "declarations of intention,
casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of
memory, pointing backwards to the past [and that] there would be an end, or nearly that.
to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored").
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it to his advantage.
(2) Purpose Distinctions-Focusingon Declarantor Defendant
Standard hearsay doctrine also distinguishes between a crime
victim's fear statement when used to prove the victim's state of mind

or conduct and when used to prove the state of mind or conduct of
another. A crime victim's statements evidencing fear of the
defendant or relating threats by the defendant usually are
inadmissible to prove defendant's conduct or state of mind." Such
statements are admissible only to rebut defendant's claim with
respect to the victim's conduct or state of mind."1 Thus, a murder
victim's statement of fear of her husband is inadmissible to show

faulty marriage in order to establish defendant's motive,

2

but is

admissible to prove the victim's fear of defendant in order to rebut

defendant's claim that the victim provoked defendant's lethal
conduct

3

or that the she consented to sexual acts.

4

250. This is the majority view. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767769 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding inadmissible a statement of the murder victim that she
feared the defendant); People v. Arcega, 651 P.2d 338, 350 (Cal. 1982) (holding
inadmissible the victim's statements relating defendant's threats when offered to prove
that the threats were actually made and that defendant most likely carried them out);
People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 583 (Cal. 1969) (holding that statements of the victim
evidencing fear of defendant are inadmissible since ordinarily neither the victim's conduct
nor state of mind is an issue in the action); see also State v. Baca, 902 P.2d 65, 71 (N.M.
1995); State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); People v. Floyd, 470 N.E.2d 293,295 (IMI.
1984); Hanson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 416 S.E.2d 14, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 571 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Singh, 586
S.W.2d 410,418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
A minority of states allow statements of unavailable declarants to be used to prove
defendant's conduct or state of mind directly, usually fitting the statement within a
residual exception. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 461 S.E.2d 687, 704 (N.C. 1995); State v.
Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 850-51 (S.D. 1993); State v. Fleton, 412 S.E.2d 344, 357 (N.C.
1992); State v. Triplett, 340 S.E.2d 736,742 (N.C. 1986). Triplett and Alston reasoned that
the victim's fear of defendant evidenced "ill will" between them which was probative of
motive and identity, but this approach is merely a circuitous way of using the statement to
prove defendant's conduct.
251. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that
the deceased's statements of fear of the accused would be admissible to rebut defendant's
claim that (1) the deceased was the aggressor and defendant acted in self-defense, (2) that
the deceased committed suicide, or (3) that the death was accidental). See also People v.
Green, 609 P.2d 468, 480-81 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds by People v. Hall, 718
P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986). (holding admissible as non-hearsay the victim's statements relating
defendant's threats when the victim's state of mind was made relevant by defendant's
claim that she voluntarily accompanied him on the morning of the murder).
252. See People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 863 (Cal. 1988) ( holding that such statements
were also inadmissible to prove lying-in-wait by showing why defendant needed to catch
the victim off-guard).
253. See People v. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 3rd 866, 871-72 (1978); People v. Finch 213
Cal. App. 2d 752,765 (1963); 1 WrrKiN, CALIFORNiA EVIDENCE §563 (3d ed. 1986).
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In the O.J. Simpson criminal trial Judge Ito admitted evidence of
specific instances of defendant's past spousal abuse in the form of
police photos and witness testimony concerning her injuries 5 and the
victim's "911 call" in which defendant uttered threats and kicked
down the victim's door. 6 However, the judge excluded on hearsay
grounds statements the victim made to friends and statements she
wrote in her diary expressing her fear of defendant and recounting
acts of abuse and stalking by the defendant, some occurring more
recent than the 911 call. 7 In her diary she wrote that defendant beat
her and tore off her clothing, 8 and she told friends and relatives that
defendant was following her and that she was afraid of him and
believed that he was going to kill her. 9
Judge Ito was correct in holding that these statements were
inadmissible hearsay under existing California law, since the defense
had not raised any issue with respect to the victim's conduct prior to
the homicide.2" Yet suppression of such important statements was
disturbing to Judge Ito, as it must have been to the general public.
Judge Ito remarked:
To the man or woman on the street, the relevance and probative
value of such evidence is both obvious and compelling, especially
those statements made just days before the homicide. It seems only
just and right that a crime victim's own words be heard, especially
in the court where the facts and circumstances of her demise are to
be presented. However, the laws and appellate court decisions that
must be applied by the trial court hold otherwise.261
In an ad hoc reaction to the Simpson acquittal, the California
legislature enacted a new hearsay exception which admits statements
of unavailable victims of "physical injury" which narrate, describe, or
explain the infliction of such injury, provided the statements were
made "at or near" the injury, made under circumstances indicating
254. See People v. Thompson, 753 P.2d 37, 46 (Cal. 1988).
255. See Ruling, People v. Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 21768, at 3-4 (Cal.
Super. Ct. L.A. County, Jan. 18, 1995). The court also allowed the prosecutor to offer
various evidence regarding "stalking incidents," but the prosecution later decided not to
offer much of it. Id. at 6.
256. See id. at 7-8.
257. See id. at 4. The defense referred to the diary as a memo to her lawyer. The
judge also excluded a telephone call to a shelter for abused women by a woman with
characteristics matching those of the victim Ms. Simpson. See infra Part III.F.3.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 4-5.
260. See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 583 (Cal 1969) and People v. Arcega, 651
P.2d 338, 350 (Cal. 1982). In California, it is reversible error to admit statements of a
homicide victim expressing fear of the accused even when made on the very day of the
crime. People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 862-63 (Cal. 1988).
261. Ruling, People v. Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 21768, at 5 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. County, Jan. 18, 1995).

Mar. 1998]

HEARSAY HAZARDS

truthworthiness, and made in writing, electronically recorded, or to a
law enforcement official.262

Instead of this narrow case-directed

approach, the California legislature should have adopted either a
residual exception263 or an adversary-oriented exception which would
admit a broader category of nonadversary-created statements than
merely those of victims of physical injury, but which would generally
exclude statements to police or other law enforcement officials,
particularly when not recorded or otherwise verified as actually
made.2 4
(3) Benefits of Focusing on Adversary FactorsRather than on Temporal or
PurposeDistinctions

In addition to more liberal admission of probative evidence,
more lenient admissibility rules with respect to nonadversary-created
hearsay will lessen the need for mind-bending instructions which ask
the factfinder to consider statements for the purpose of determining
the state of mind of the declarant, but not for the truth of the facts in
the statement or for the purpose of determining another's conduct.
For example, in admitting the murder victim's fear statements, the
court would not be required to direct the jury to consider the
statements only to prove the victim's state of mind or conduct, but
not to prove defendant's conduct, although evidence of the victim's
conduct contradicts defendant's story regarding his own conduct.
In the O.J. Simpson civil trial defendant testified, painting a
picture of himself as a loving husband and father who could not have
fatally slashed his former wife and denying ever hitting or hurting her
other than in one "wrestling" incident.2" He claimed that her death
so surprised and shocked him that he was left distraught and suicidal.
To counter these images, Judge Fujisaki allowed the plaintiffs to
introduce portions of Ms. Simpson's letters which expressed concern
for her safety and her diary which claimed that the defendant had
"beat the holy hell" out of her. However, the Judge warned jurors
that the letters and diary could not be considered for the truth, but
262. CAL. EVmD. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998). This section was enacted in 1996.
263. California has no residual exceptions comparable to those of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
264. For an argument supporting even broader admissibility, see Karleen F. Murphy,
Note, A Hearsay Exceptionfor Physical Abuse, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 497, 513514 (1997) (contending that statements of threatened or inflicted physical abuse are
"analogous to... declarations against interest" and are particularly trustworthy since
"recording, or reporting such incidents to a law enforcement official runs the risk that
[declarant's] abuser, or threatened abuser will discover the report and retaliate.").
265. Transcript, Examination of Orenthal James Simpson, Jan. 10, 1997, 1997 WL
7760, at 12-23 (Cal. Super. Trans.)
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only as an indication of the victim's state of mind.2" Judge Fujisaki

also permitted a worker at the Sojourn House, a shelter for abused
women, to testify that she received a telephone call from one
identifying herself as Nicole, a Caucasian woman in her mid-thirties,
divorced for eight years, living in West L. A. with two children (a girl
and boy), and whose "very high profile" ex-husband had beaten and
was now stalking her.267 The caller said that he had threatened to kill
her if he ever caught her with another man and that she was
frightened of him. 68 The following day, Judge Fujisaki instructed the
jury that they must consider the call only for the limited purpose of
proving the caller's state of mind or conduct, and not for "the
substance of her statement.., as evidence of any event or whether
such event occurred" or as "evidence of any state of mind, intent, or
'
acts attributable to Mr. Simpson."269
Such limiting instructions are terribly misleading and confusing.
The ultimate issue in the case concerned defendant's conduct--did he

kill his former wife? Evidence not helpful on this question in some
manner would be irrelevant and inadmissible. This is so despite the
fact that limited use of the victim's statements may require a number
of intervening inferences involving the victim's state of mind and
266. Transcript, Examination of Sandra Claiborne and E.J. Flammer, Jan. 14 1997,
1997 WL 11733, at 1 (Cal. Super. Trans.).
267. Transcript, Examination of Nancy Ney, Ronald A. Fischman, and Paula Barbieri,
December 4, 1996, 1996 WL 694142, at 8-10 (Cal. Super Trans.).
268. See id. at 11.
269. Transcript, Examination of Randall R. Petee, Dr. Leonore E. A. Walker, Jim
Merrell, and Mark Partridge, December 5, 1996, WL 697576, at 3-4 (Cal, Super. Trans.).
The full instruction was as follows:
THE COURT: The testimony [of the Sojourn House Worker with respect to the
telephone call from Nicole] was received into evidence for the limited purposefor a limited purpose, and cannot be considered by the jury for any other
purpose. It has been contended previously that Nicole Brown Simpson was
trying to get back together with Mr. Simpson; that she was fearful of him, or that
she did not want to reconcile with him; or that she had a state of mind that was
one way or the other at different times. The testimony ... about the telephone
call was offered by the plaintiff to show Nicole's state of mind regarding the
relationship at the time the call was made, and to explain her conduct as it may
relate to Mr. Simpson at the recital the night of her death. This testimony is
received only to show her state of mind, and to explain her conduct. The jury
must not consider the substance of her statement.., as evidence of any event or
whether such event occurred. The testimony is not evidence of any state of
mind, intent, or acts attributable to Mr. Simpson, and cannot be considered by
the jury for such purpose .... That the substance of the conversation-you
cannot consider whether they were real, truthful, or anything. You may only
consider the telephone conversation as it may show what the caller's state of
mind was at that time or about that time. Everybody understand that?
JURORS: (Nod affirmatively.)
Id. at 4-5.
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conduct. Provided these statements were not adversary-created, it
would have been preferable for the court to admit them with a
practical "consumer warning" concerning the weaknesses of secondhand evidence and the inability of the defense to question the

declarant, rather than to give confusing, technical instructions which
draw distinctions "too fine to be disentangled by a jury"'27 or, for that
matter, by professionals.
(4) Defense Hearsay
(a) Presenting a More Complete Defense
Broader admissibility of nonadversary-created statements often
will aid the accused in presenting a more complete defense.
Common law and statutory hearsay rules generally apply in the same
manner to the prosecution and the defense, 1 and can be even more
restrictive with respect to exonerating hearsay.'
It is true that
defendant's right to admit hearsay evidence is not constitutionally
restricted, as is the prosecution's, and the Sixth Amendment
Compulsory Process Clause and other constitutional guarantees may
on occasion require admission of defense hearsay otherwise barred
by rules of evidence.'
However, the scope of defendant's
constitutional right to introduce exonerating evidence is unclear. In
Montana v. Egelhoff,274 four justices believed that due process
demands that a criminal defendant be afforded a fair opportunity for
270. Shepard v. United States, 295 U.S. 96,106 (1933).
271. The Federal Rules contain some exceptions to the general rule that foundational
requirements are the same whether hearsay is offered by the prosecution or the defense.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (imposing specific restrictions on prosecution use of
judgments of conviction).
272. See FD. R. EVID.804(b)(3) (imposing specific restrictions on use of statements
against penal interest when offered to exonerate the accused).
273. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that a statute which
renders an accomplice incompetent to testify on behalf of a criminal defendant violates
the defendant's right of compulsory process); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973) (holding that a state rule of evidence violated due process by barring the
defendant from introducing a third party's confession to the crime charged and by
prohibiting impeachment of the third party by such confession); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 318 (1974) (holding that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
requires that a statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings yield to allow
defendant to impeach a prosecution witness for bias by showing he was on juvenile court
probation).
274. 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2016-17 (1996) (holding that Montana law that provides that
voluntary intoxication "may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence
of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] offense" does not violate due
process).
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''meaningful adversarial testing" of the State's case which includes
the right to present "competent, reliable evidence.., essential to the
accused's defense."
However, four other justices rejected the
argument that due process guarantees the right to introduce "all
relevant evidence" or "critical evidence" favorable to the defendant,
asserting that the right to introduce even "critical relevant evidence"
on behalf
of an accused can be limited by the state for "a valid"
275
reason.
More liberal admission of exonerating, nonadversary-created
hearsay may be particularly helpful to the defense in homicide cases
where statements of the victim point away from the accused. For
example, O.J. Simpson's lawyers suggested that the victim may have
been killed by drug dealers. Statements to her friends or in her
journal that she had been threatened by drug dealers and was afraid
of them would be powerful evidence for the defense, although
technically inadmissible hearsay. Some may qualify as statements
against interest-"My drug pusher said he would kill me if I did not
pay up." But others may not. The statement, "I saw the dealers beat
up my neighbor and they threatened to kill me if I go to the police" is
not inculpatory and thus not admissible under the exception. Also,
diary entries and confidential statements to close relatives may not be
viewed as against the interest of the declarant if it were unlikely that
she ever would be harmed by them. Yet it would be an injustice to
prohibit defendant from introducing non-party created written or
recorded statements of a murder victim conveying the victim's fear of
being killed by another person.
(b) Special Problems with Respect to Statements of Defendant
In a technical sense, all statements of the defendant are
adversary-created in that they are "self-elicited" by a party. Yet
defendant's "transactional-type" statements, made in the immediate
course of critical events, such as arrest or confrontation with
incriminating evidence, usually are significant and are not the
product of lawyer advocacy. However, as noted previously, special
concerns arise with respect to defendant's own out-of-court
statements when offered by the defendant since defendant is an
available witness only to the defense. While defendant's story can be
presented through other witnesses, and on occasion by defendant's
275. These justices regarded Chambers as "an exercise in highly case-specific error
correction" which held only that "under the facts and circumstances of this case the
rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial." Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022
(quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03). The remaining justice (Ginsburg) believed that
the case primarily concerned the issue of defining mens rea rather than defendant's right
to introduce relevant evidence. See id. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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pre-trial statements offered for a non-hearsay purpose or under an
exception, in many if not most cases the accused must take the stand
and submit to cross-examination in order to personally present his or
her story to the factfinder. Yet because of threats of impeachment
when testifying and Fifth Amendment protections when declining to
do so, it appears that fewer defendants are taking the stand at
criminal trials. Rules barring defense hearsay at least provide some
inducement to testify. If the accused could freely introduce prior his
or her own exonerating statements, particularly ones prepared and
packaged by defense counsel, the defense could quite easily introduce
defendant's personal story untested by cross-examination.
Thus, we are faced with conflicting interests-the defendant's
interest in presenting his or her own "transactional" statements made
during critical events which often have significant probative value
and the prosecution's interest in avoiding the presentation of a
fabricated defense which cannot be tested by cross-examination. An
adversary-oriented accommodation of these interests would lead to
admission of such statements provided they are not used as a
substitute for defendant's trial testimony. For example, evidence of
defendant's denial upon being confronted with contraband in the
immediate circumstances of its discovery, which often is excluded as
not qualifying as an excited utterance,276 should be admitted on
defendant's behalf, as long as defendant takes the stand and does not
use the statement as a substitute for defendant's own in-court
testimony. 7 A rule admitting as non-hearsay defendant's prior
consistent statements when helpful in evaluating the defendant's
credibility as a witness would serve this purpose if interpreted as
limited to nonadversary-created, transactional-type statements, as
opposed to lawyer-created or packaged denials.278
Conclusion
The primary foundations supporting rules limiting the use of
hearsay evidence rest on the procedural climate in which they
operate. Those who point to the jury as the rationale for common
law hearsay rules usually contrast professional with lay factfinding,
contending that jurors untrained in the law cannot be trusted and
276. See, e.g., United States v. Sewell, 90 F.3d 326, 327 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming the
trial court's exclusion of defendant's denial of knowledge of presence of gun found in
trunk of his car uttered immediately following its discovery on the ground that there was
not a sufficient showing of stress which "stills the reflective faculties").
277. In Sewell, the defendant took the stand in his defense, so the purpose of deterring
defendant from "testimonial substitution" was not served by excluding the statement. See
id
278. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 50, Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
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referring to the absence of the jury as the reason for the lack of
hearsay rules in continental countries. However, restrictions on
hearsay evidence appear more closely connected to adversary
procedures than to the jury. The American hearsay rules are
founded on (1) our super-adversary system and the dangers
presented by virtually unlimited party control over evidence
gathering and presentation and (2) the independent, unchecked
factfinder and the lack of means to assure integrity of verdicts which
increases the danger that uncorrectable verdicts might be based on
unreliable hearsay. To the extent that the jury justifies the hearsay
rule, it does so more on account of its character as a source of
"decision without a reason" unchecked by meaningful review than by
differences between evaluation abilities of lay and professional
factfinders. American hearsay rules in large part are aimed at
compensating for weaknesses inherent in our highly adversary system
which fragments authority, empowers parties and their lawyers, and
marginalizes judges. In a system that allocates broad powers to the
adversaries and to the factfinder, hearsay rules operate as a check on
both and compensate for the lack of significant neutral oversight of
the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial processes.
However, in cases where these dangers are significantly
diminished, rationales for exclusion of hearsay are weakened.
Consequently, we should adjust the hearsay rules to focus on the
principles of adversary taint and corroboration, more freely
admitting corroborated, nonadversary-created statements and
exercising more caution in admitting uncorroborated, adversarycreated hearsay. Specifically, our rules are unreasonably lenient in
admitting adversary-created statements without requiring clear
corroboration as a safeguard against conviction based solely on partymanufactured or contaminated hearsay evidence. On the other hand,
our hearsay rules are unreasonably restrictive, with respect to
corroborated statements of unavailable declarants which are not
party-elicited or induced. Neither the jury trial nor the adversary
system supports exclusion of nonadversary-created statements of
unavailable declarants in criminal cases when reliably preserved and
corroborated.

